

Libya: Turkey's shadow arms deliveries



About the organization

OpenFacto is a not for profit organization (law for associations 1901 in France), which aims to promote and support Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) in the francophone community. OpenFacto produces OSINT investigations and guides, organizes trainings and workshops, and supports newsrooms, universities and NGOs in OSINT research.

About the authors

The authors are volunteers and members of OpenFacto, with experience in cyber investigations and cyber security, investigations, international relations and journalism.

Legal disclaimer

The mention of any individual, company, organization, or other entity in this report does not imply the violation of any law or international agreement, and should not be construed as such.

Peer-reviewed

This report has been peer-reviewed by four individuals from established international organizations with experience in the domain of open-source research, academia, investigation and journalism. They have no affiliation with OpenFacto.

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
Research conducted between April and June 2020.
Report published in July 2020.

Executive Summary

Findings

- These six cases successfully demonstrate how Turkish manufactured heavy armament or weapons part of the Turkish arsenal have been delivered to GNA-affiliated factions in Libya. Between May 2019 and March 2020, five deliveries were identified from start to finish. Additional deliveries – successful or attempted – were associated with the vessels or planes identified. A pattern aiming at concealing the origin of goods, senders and routes to Libya emerged from the analysis:
 - Logistics: using mainly non-Turkish shipping lines for transport, working with arms traffickers.
 - Navigation: using coastal roads to circumvent risky European territorial waters for Turkish shipments, departing from a foreign country with a stop-over in Turkey or indicating a false arrival destination.
 - Technical: spoofing AIS data and “going dark” to avoid detection.
 - Physical: changing the appearance of the boat.
 - Human: changing from international crews to Turkish crews prevent any information leak.
 - Military: using Turkish military frigates to escort boats to prevent interception in European seas or attacks at the final destination.
 - Security: strengthening physical and online operational security with less and less opportunities to get deliberate or accidental images of vessels, deliveries, materials.
- Research on MV AMAZON indicates a clear violation of the arms embargo by Turkey. We are able to identify the shipment of a large number of armored military vehicles manufactured by BMC Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AS, as well as other lethal arms, which were received by pro-GNA militias. The shipping operation was conducted by a Turkish company specializing officially in fruit and vegetable transportation, which has also been involved in arms trafficking for other armed groups, allegedly including the Russian security company Wagner.
- The aircraft ER-BAJ appears to be part of a recurring transport link between Turkey and Libya, operated by civil aviation companies previously involved in arms trafficking:
 - A Libyan company, GASG/Global Air Transport, chartered the 747 Boeing and is known to have transported arms in Libya and Somalia.
 - The plane's owner Aerotranscargó is a Moldovan company previously accused of having delivered weapons in Libya and Syria.
- Open source research reveals circumstantial evidence around MV SINGLE EAGLE's possible involvement in arms transit, showing:
 - Turkey could be in violation of the arms embargo by delivering new equipment to Libya - Hawk and Korkut anti-aircraft defense systems - on the MV Single Eagle.

- The ship is associated with the German subsidiary of the Lebanese Abou Merhi Group: AML Ship Management GmbH.
- Following the arrest of MV BANA's captain in Italy on its return from Libya, open-sources brought to light a new arms shipment from Turkey in violation of the embargo, with the possible dissemination of the materiel to pro-GNA factions. MV BANA can be identified at the port of Tripoli and in Turkey prior to its journey. The ship also belongs to the Abou Merhi Group, which was sanctioned for two years by the United States Treasury for logistical support to a drug trafficker affiliated with Hezbollah. Abou Merhi Group and its affiliates were removed from sanctions list in 2017 but the recent suspected activities raise questions over this decision.
- MV ANA, owned by an Albanian shipping company, was targeted by an air strike in Tripoli Port, while allegedly making an arms delivery to the GNA. An attempt was later made to conceal a second delivery by MV ANA by changing its name to MV PRAY, repainting it and spoofing its IMO number on the AIS system. Strong questions remain on the administrative compliance of MV PRAY with the International Maritime Organization for the registration of the IMO number and with Tanzania for using a Tanzanian flag. In addition, the investigation reveals the likely involvement of military entities in managing containers not delivered to Libya following the boat interception by the French army.



Approach

- This report investigates the Turkish Government's support to Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA), setting out a methodology to detect arms embargo violations through open-source research.
- OpenFacto looked at six suspected cases using the following methodology:
 - The detection of arms deliveries reported by Libyan newspaper and social media, identification of the weapons, manufacturers and links with Turkey.
 - The identification of the mode of transport, vessels/planes, reconstruction of the routes, identification of shipping companies and assessments of their previous activities.

- The identification of the sender and recipient of the delivery, as far as is possible.
- UN resolutions on the arms embargo on Libya indicate the circumstances under which arms deliveries are permitted or constitute a violation. Exclusions in Libya are limited to arms and material protecting international organizations and NGOs, or ensuring order for the recognized government (GNA) following approval from the UN Committee. None of the case studies were either declared, approved or fall into the above exclusions.
- Based on the research conducted for this report, OpenFacto has been able to develop a methodology for the detection of embargo or sanction violations using open-source information. This provides a framework for initial research in the field and also highlights areas for further investigations beyond OSINT.

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
Page 145 Glossary

Methodology

The purpose of the project and the resulting report is to demonstrate the effectiveness of open-source research as a means of detecting and proving potential violations of arms embargoes and sanctions. Open sources can be defined as all publicly available information which can be found online.

Throughout the research process, there was no interaction with any individuals with privileged knowledge or the use of closed or private information sources - all evidence exists in the public domain. For demonstration purposes, the project focused on the Libyan crisis, specifically on Turkey's support to Libya.

First, the authors determined a generic supply chain model mapping an arms supply transaction between Turkey and Libya. This allowed us to break down the research question into smaller parts and begin to identify where relevant information could be found.



Based on this generic model, the authors focused their research on four areas:

1. Detection of Turkish military equipment used in Libya through the announcements of Libyan officials and/or posts on social media.
2. Identification of the material made in Turkey or belonging to the Turkish arsenal and transferred to Libya.
3. Identification of the recipients of the equipment and their affiliation.
4. Detection of the means and method of transportation and identification of the companies involved.

Based on this supply chain model, the authors surveyed authoritative sources such as UN panel of experts reports, as well as coverage in Libyan and Turkish newspapers. The authors also surveyed official announcements published by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of Na-

tional Accord (GNA) on social media to identify posts mentioning any delivery of Turkish arms in Libya.

From this point, the authors cross-checked the reports with any visual evidence of a shipment that could be found on social media: video or images of the delivery in itself. These findings were verified to ensure the information was accurate, and not recycled images or evidence being misused by a party. Social media posts were also vital in helping identify the recipients of deliveries, and also if materiel was appearing in the Libyan military landscape for the first time.

Based on this research, the authors were able to establish potential delivery windows and looked at the activities of Libyan ports within the timeframes in order to identify any suspicious boats traveling from Turkey to Libya. Additional data was then gathered using MarineTraffic, including boat names and IMO numbers. When investigating potential air deliveries, the authors researched visual evidence of planes stationed at Libyan airports, and cross-checked with data from FlightRadar24 and free satellite imagery where available (Sentinel Hub and Google Earth).

Once enough evidence was gathered to be confident a delivery had taken place, the authors looked at identifying the corporate structures owning and operating the boats or planes. Using Equasis and FlightRadar24 websites, it was possible to identify commercial operators and owners. Through corporate registers, combined with LinkedIn and Google research, it was then possible to identify some shareholders and key individuals, and explore their background and previous operations.

This report's methodology has several limitations. First, the analysis and conclusions in this study are based exclusively in open-source research. This study captures a snapshot of the procurement chain which was in the public domain at the time of the research. Second, OpenFacto has had no access to bill of lading or airways bills to compare with visuals on social media or how shipments were recorded on official export documentation. Third, while OpenFacto uses official corporate records to verify some corporate holdings and commercial relationships, this information only represents a snapshot of corporate activity at a given time: records may not be updated regularly, may not be consistent or wholly accurate, and may not have the same standards of reporting across jurisdictions. Finally, the report should serve as a basis to raise further questions, identify gaps and launch deeper investigations and subsequent analysis.


Unless explicitly stated, the mention of an individual, company, organization, or other entity in this report does not necessarily imply the violation of any law or international agreement and should not be construed to so imply.

Introduction

The current crisis in Libya is rooted in the civil war that erupted in early 2011 during the “Arab Spring”, which triggered an intervention from a NATO-led coalition on the grounds of protecting the civilian population. Gaddafi was ousted from power following the fall of Tripoli to the rebel forces on August 20th 2011, although pockets of resistance remained, especially in Sirte. Gaddafi was captured and killed by rebel fighters in October 2011. The fall of Gaddafi’s regime resulted in the emergence of several armed groups and militias manned by former official military forces and rebel fighters, fueling instability and violence in the country.

Violence escalated following disputed elections in 2014, which resulted in two rival administrations, with Fayeze al-Sarraj at the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar leading the Libyan National Army (LNA) from Tobruk. Under the Libyan Political Agreement, led by the United Nations and signed in December 2015, the GNA is officially recognized as the sole legitimate executive authority in Libya.

In the subsequent conflict between the two sides, the LNA has seized large portions of Libya through successive offensives: Benghazi in 2017, Derna in 2019 and an attempt on Tripoli, launched in April 2019.



Map in April 2020 (blue: GNA, red: LNA, green: other militias) – LiveUA maps

In recent years, a number of foreign powers have become involved in the conflict, supporting different parties. Although backed by the UN, the GNA relies mainly on military and financial

assistance from Turkey and Qatar. The LNA is military supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. France and Italy are displaying political preferences based on their national security interest: counter-terrorism in the Sahel and the migration crisis facing Europe. While the US is officially supporting the GNA, the country has remained distant from the conflict. Russia seems to be more and more involved on the LNA side with a more visible presence of PMC Wagner.

While an arms embargo has been in place since 2011, numerous violations have been documented and remain ongoing. Currently, both parties to the conflict receive support from foreign mercenaries, weapons and military equipment, and technical support in violation of the sanction measures. Investigative reports and news articles have identified Jordan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates as routinely supplying arms to the conflict.

Regime of arms embargo on Libya

In response to violence against civilians in Libya, UN Security Council Resolution 1970, adopted in February 2011, imposed an arms embargo on the country. This resolution was complemented by later additional resolutions.

The provisions of the embargo determine what is permitted and forbidden in Libya in terms of the supply of arms, lighter weapons, training and technical support, as well as inspection frameworks.

The arms embargo on Libya is a 'two-way' embargo: it requires all UN member states to prevent the sale or supply to Libya of arms and related material of all types, and prohibits the export by Libya and procurement by UN member states of all arms and related material.

This embargo includes all arms, weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts.

Some exceptions are carved out of the embargo provisions and include:

- Protective clothing (including flak jackets and military helmets for UN staff, humanitarian and media workers and associated personnel) temporarily exported to Libya
- other sales or supply of arms and related material, or provision of assistance or personnel with an **advance approval by the UN Committee on Libya**
- small arms and light weapons temporarily exported to Libya for the sole use of UN personnel, media and humanitarian workers and associated personnel **with advance notification to and absence of negative decision by the UN Committee on Libya.**
- lethal arms and related materiel of all types, intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities **with advance approval by the UN Committee on Libya.**

Failure to comply with these provisions constitute a listing criteria to impose targeted sanctions (travel ban or assets freeze) to individuals and entities. According to paragraph 23 of resolution 1973 (2011) and paragraph 11 (e) of resolution 2213 (2015), individuals or entities having violated, or assisted in the evasion of, the provisions of resolution 1970, particularly the arms embargo, or to have assisted others in doing so can be listed on targeted sanction list.

The case studies in this report all represent potential violations of the arms embargo: they are all examples of arms supplied by a UN member state to Libya without prior advanced notification, late notification or approval from the UN Committee on Libya.

Case Study: MV Amazon

On 18 May 2019, images and videos appeared on social networks showing a Moldovan-flagged ship delivering armoured vehicles in Tripoli Port. From that starting point, this OSINT investigation demonstrates the following:

- A clear violation of the arms embargo on Libya by Turkey through the shipping of a large number of armoured military vehicles made by BMC Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AS¹ and other military lethal arms.
- A research on social networks helps identifying some of the pro-GNA militias receiving the shipment.
- A logistics operation used to ship these vehicles by sea using a shipping company specialised in fruit and vegetable transportation.
- A study of the shipping company reveals the fleet is involved in arms trafficking for other armed groups, allegedly including the security company Wagner.

This study builds on the compelling evidence already presented in a UN Security Council panel of Experts 2019 annual report:

2. **MV Amazon**

67. On 18 May 2019 a large consignment of Kirpi 4x4 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles,⁵⁸ manufactured by BMC Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AS,⁵⁹ was offloaded in Tripoli port from the Moldovan-flagged MV *Amazon* (IMO 7702657). The media covered this event extensively, and no effort was made to disguise the delivery. The vehicles were collected by Ashraf Mami, on behalf of designated individual Salah Badi (LYi.028) of the Al Somoud brigade and Mohamed Bin Ghuzzi of the Al Marsa brigade.⁶⁰ Vehicles were also supplied to the 33rd Infantry Regiment led by Bashir Khalafallah.

68. The Panel notes that the MV *Amazon* left Samsun, Turkey, on 9 May 2019, transited the Bosphorus on 11 May 2019 and then went “dark” for the night of 14/15 May 2019 while in the vicinity of Izmir port. Izmir is coincidentally the location of the BMC Pinarbaşı production plant of the Kirpi 4x4 MRAP vehicles. The Panel finds that the vessel’s operator, Akdeniz Roro Deniz Tasimaciligi Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Sti.⁶¹ is in non-compliance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the transportation of this military equipment to Libya. Full details can be found in annex 31 and a summary of the supply chain is illustrated in figure I.


source : UN 2019 Panel of Expert report²

1 <https://www.bmc.com.tr/>

2 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_914.pdf

1. A large volume of Turkish tactical military equipment is delivered in Libya to GNA-affiliated brigades


Several videos and photos quickly circulated on social networks and pro-GNA Telegram accounts on May 18th. They help us chrono-geolocate the event at Tripoli Port, identify the equipment, estimate quantities and identify the vessel transporting them³.

 **Emadeddin Badi**
@emad_badi

Video of arrival of what seems like #Turkish-made BMC KIRPI II at #Misrata's port.


Person recording threatens a certain "Mohsen" (so Al-Kani from #Tarhuna), which leaves little room for doubt that these deliveries are recent.

Making it now a full-blown proxy war in #Libya...



♥ 139 14:24 - 18 mai 2019

💬 105 personnes parlent à ce sujet

 **CO**
@CapteursO

Just seen on #libya pro GNA telegram account - can't find the ship online / seems to be Turkish carrier




♥ 4 14:15 - 18 mai 2019

³ Twitter: https://twitter.com/CapteursO/status/1129737310805872640?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwtterm%5E1129737310805872640&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fopenfacto.fr%2Fmv-amazon-from-delivering-fruit-and-veg-to-arms-shipping%2F and https://twitter.com/emad_badi/status/1129739638950780930?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwtterm%5E1129739638950780930&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fopenfacto.fr%2Fmv-amazon-from-delivering-fruit-and-veg-to-arms-shipping%2F

1.1. The shipment is independently chrono-located in Libya transporting heavy equipment

By using satellite imagery from Sentinel Hub Explorer⁴ on the 05/18/2019 we can see a large vessel docked at Tripoli Port. While this image is low resolution, Ben Strick⁵ has since posted a better quality image⁶. We can see a large number of vehicles on the deck, counting at least six rows of six tactical vehicles – 36 in total – while reports on social networks suggest 80 were delivered.



On Sentinel Hub Explorer, a large vessel is docked at Tripoli Port

4 https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?lat=32.905222&lng=13.183288&zoom=17&time=2019-05-18&preset=1_TRUE_COLOR&datasource=Sentinel-2%20L1C

5 <https://www.twitter.com/bendobrown>

6 <https://twitter.com/BenDoBrown/status/1140861700188659712>



source: Maxar

Thanks to satellite images tweeted by Ben Strick, we can even start counting armoured vehicles.

In addition to satellite imagery, photos of the loaded ship can be found on social media at different stages of its journey. Before reaching Libya, the suspicious ship is spotted⁷ on May 15th southbound of Chios Strait on its way to Tripoli in Lebanon with covered cargo on its upper deck.

⁷ <https://twitter.com/AegeanHawk/status/1128717298129362944>



Photos by twitter.com/aegeanhawk

As the ship is docked in Libya and before being unloaded, vehicles on the upper deck appear uncovered and visible on several photos⁸ taken on May 18th, 2019, which can be geolocated to Tripoli Port.

⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/343295659868687/photos/pcb.365361407662112/365360617662191/?type=3&theater> and <https://i0.wp.com/almarsad.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/11636296-AAA9-4C88-B4B3-F5D678286CEB.jpeg?fit=540%2C720&ssl=1>




Photos on pro-GNA Facebook accounts⁹

⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/343295659868687/photos/a.343328703198716/365360617662191/?type=3&theater>
17

1.2. Turkish BMC Otomotiv vehicles

Photos and videos appearing on the occasion of the delivery give a lot of insight on the shipment delivered in Tripoli port. There are two types of armoured vehicles on photos circulating.



One type of armoured vehicle



Second type of armoured vehicle

Information on the type of armoured vehicles can be easily gathered thanks to a catalogue uploaded online by the Turkish government to promote its defence industry. For the first type of vehicles we can compare the different models by looking at the number of lights on the front and how they are arranged. It leads us to identify the first model as a Kirpi II model made by BMC.

WHEELED ARMoured VEHICLES

KIRPI
BMC

Mine resistant ambush protected vehicle KIRPI is the most effective defence vehicle used mainly by Turkey and its allies. With its brand-new version KIRPI II, 4x4 and 6x6 versions and hardware, the KIRPI continues to offer special solutions to meet different kind of demands. The KIRPI II fitted with independent suspension has a unibody armoured cabin, special armoured windshields, shock-absorber seats, a weapon station and an emergency exit hatch.



NMS 4x4
BMC

NM5 4x4 is built on previous experience and constantly being improved by direct feedback from the operational use of our existing armoured vehicle fleet. NMS 4x4 takes the performance levels of lightweight armoured vehicles beyond that currently on offer around the globe. NMS 4x4 provides ballistic and Mine/IED protection that fully complies with STANAG 4569 and can easily be increased to required level. NMS 4x4 is engineered for utilization of Police Forces and Military Units. The modular design of NMS 4x4 enables the users to cover wide range of special operations such as low-intensity combat operations, transportation of troops & equipment, air defence, reconnaissance and light fire support. The user requirement and the integration of modern battlefield systems have been considered from the beginning. All these features make NMS 4x4 an extremely attractive and useful solution for today's hybrid warfare. NMS 4x4 can carry a substantial payload for a vehicle of its size.



PARS 4x4
FNSS

The PARS 4x4 has been designed to undertake special operational roles such as advanced surveillance, anti-tank and command & control. The PARS 4x4 can operate on any rough terrain with a low centre of gravity, fully independent suspension system, ABS-assisted hydraulic disc brakes, low ground pressure and increased angles of approach and departure. Thanks to the hydraulic recovery winch, located at the front of the vehicle, it has the ability to provide self-recovery when required. The windows are ballistically protected and designed to afford a wide field of view for both the driver and the crew. The command and warning panels and the height-adjustable mine-protected seats have been specifically developed for the commander, driver, gunner and military personnel with their equipment. The vehicle is made of a ballistic hull, which provides protection against mines and improvised explosives.



WHEELED ARMoured VEHICLES

PARS 6X6 SCOUT
FNSS

The PARS 6X6 SCOUT special purpose tactical wheeled vehicle is equipped with modern technologies that provide strategic advantages to its user, including a high situational awareness feature that is designed especially for reconnaissance and internal security operations. This design approach provides the vehicle with the ability to move comfortably even over loose and soft terrain, while also providing increased road-holding at high speeds and short braking distances. The vehicle has 6X6 and 6X4 driving characteristics and all of its axles can be locked when necessary. PARS 6X6 SCOUT is fully amphibious. The two-man cab at the front of the vehicle is protected by transparent armour (ballistic glass) and provides a 230° horizontal field of vision, high driving safety, situational awareness and comfort. The PARS 6X6 SCOUT hull can be brought to the level of protection required by the user thanks to its modular designed armour system.



PARS III 6X6
FNSS

PARS III 6X6 employ the latest designs and technologies with a focus on the performance and durability of modern military operational requirements. This design approach provides the vehicle with the ability to move comfortably even over loose and soft terrain, while also providing increased road-holding at high speeds and short braking distance. The fully independent hydro-pneumatic suspension system, which provides it with the highest wheel travel in its class, ensures optimum road grip over different road conditions. The PARS III 6X6, with its first and third axle steering system, has the lowest turning circle in its class. The PARS III 6X6 hull can be brought to the level of protection required by the user via the modular designed armour system. The hull form, underbody structure, base plates and specially developed mine-resistant seats are designed to protect personnel against high-level mine threats.




Source : <https://www.ssb.gov.tr/urunkatalog/en/30/>

On its website BMC even promote the Kirpi model as a very resistant anti-mine ambush vehicle.

BMC

Corporate Bus Truck Defence Services Sales and Services Contact Us Turkish



HIGH PROTECTION WITH BMC KIRPI II (4X4) MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED ARMoured VEHICLE!

- With its **weapon system** integration for different needs, it is ready for any mission in any condition...
- Multistage high protection with its **special capsule design** and two-layer special armor structure...
- Moving away from the scene of crime even with a flat tire with **Run Flat technology**...
- High handling and passenger comfort with **independent suspension**...

source : <http://www.bmc.com.tr/>



source : <http://www.bmc.com.tr/>

The other vehicle is another type of armoured vehicle looking like the VURAN model released in 2016 with again specific lights on its front.



source : [armyrecognition.com](http://www.armyrecognition.com)

According to its own website, the company is one of the largest manufacturers of armoured tactical vehicles in the Turkish defence industry. Established in 1964, its shareholding is majority Turkish (51%) with an investment from the Industrial Committee of Qatar Armed Forces since 2014. It is worth noting that the company's production site is located in Izmir.

Additionally photos of ammunitions, sniper rifles, machine guns and missiles are posted online by some of the militias receiving the equipment and sympathising media. It is not possible to locate the photos at the Port or in the boat.



ويُنْتِج الصور ومقاطع الفيديو التي نشر لواء الصمود وكذلك صفحة كتيبة المرسى التي أسسها ويقودها بادي شخصياً بعضاً منها عبر صفحته الرسمية على فيسبوك لحظة إنزال السفينة لشحنها من المدرعات.

Source: <https://almarsad.co/>



missiles



ammunitions



PKM machine guns



machine guns

While the photos seem to be original, the first PKM machine guns photo exists already on an airsoft website.



удитель превратил стандартный 3-й ГИР в пулеметный,пут
оторая не только фиксирует ГИРбокс в теле КИТа. Но и слу
ть 160-ю пружину без особых опасений. Так же как доп опц
на 249-м ГИРе, и интеграции во внутрь КИТа системы зас
чей. Снаружи вся эта прелесть упакована в крайне антураж
прелестями типа масленок, чехлов, лент, ММГ патронов 7.6



Source: <http://airsoft-gomel.blogspot.com/2012/10/pkm-airsoft-machine-gun.html>

The second machine gun seems to be a Bulgarian MG-M1 7.62 x 54R mm machine gun as we can see from the cross.



A Bulgarian MG-M1 7.62 x 54R mm machine gun exported to Iraq in 2005. Documented by a Conflict Armament Research field investigation team in Kobane, Syria, February 2015¹⁰

The missiles appears to be AT-3 sagger 9k11 malyutka, which are anti-tank guided missile system developed in the early 1960s by the Soviet Union. It was designed to be a man-portable guided weapon This weapon system remains in widespread use today as it is a cost-efficient and simple to use modern anti-tank guided weapon. These missiles would be largely present in Libya.



AT-3 sagger 9k11 from the shipment



AT-3 sagger 9k11 reference

¹⁰ https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjPmOb30YHqAhUQ1xoKHRSiCksQFjAAegQIBBA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conflictarm.com%2Fdownload-file%2F%3Freport_id%3D2568%26file_id%3D2574&usg=AOvVaw3pcehoGFcMnjJij0C9z74p

1.3. Pro-GNA militias headed by UN sanctioned individual appears as the shipment's recipient at the Port

On social networks¹¹, pro-GNA accounts published photos of the vehicles being delivered. A photo specifically allows to identify individuals linked to Al Samood militia.



Facebook account of Ashraf Mami – photo posted on May 18th 2019¹²

On this photos showing three individuals at Tripoli Port receiving the shipment we have Ashraf Mami in the foreground (red) and Mohammed Bin Ghazi (blue) in the middle.

Ashraf Mami is an officer at the Ministry of Foreign affairs in the Government of National Accord but is also an active fighter in a GNA-affiliated militia.



Follow

1,362 posts 3,341 followers 3,142 following

Ashraf Mami
Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Source: <https://www.instagram.com/ashrafmami/>

11 www.facebook.com

12 <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2223762154339085&set=pb.100001159674428.-2207520000..&type=3&theater>

On his Facebook profile we can see him fighting and accompanying pro-GNA militia.



Source: facebook.com¹³

He also appears with Salah Badi, the commander of Al Somoud Brigade, a now GNA-rallied militia established as one of the military support base of the GNA. He is believed to be a close aide to Salah Badi



On these two photos we see Salah Badi, Ashraf Mami and Mohammed Bin Ghazi circled in red¹⁴

13 <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2835091416539486&set=pb.100001159674428.-2207520000..&type=3&theater>

Salah Badi has been sanctioned by the UN and the US treasury OFAC for its attempt to undermine Libya's political resolution since 2018.

November 19, 2018

Action Taken Concurrently with the UN Security Council

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), concurrent with the UN Security Council's Libya Sanctions Committee, took action today targeting Salah Badi (Badi), the leader of the Sumud Brigade militia that has sparked violent clashes in the south of Libya's capital, Tripoli. Upon entering Tripoli in late August 2018, Badi also called for support from other militias to attack the city, plunging it into turmoil. The Sumud Brigade has waged attacks against rival militias aligned with the Government of National Accord, through which Badi has undermined the peace, security, and stability of Libya.

"Salah Badi's prolonged militia attacks on Libya's capital have devastated the city and disrupted the peace," said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "Treasury is targeting rogue actors in Libya who have contributed to chaos and turmoil that undermines the internationally recognized Government of National Accord."

Today, OFAC designated Salah Badi pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13726, "Blocking Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Persons Contributing to the Situation in Libya," for being the leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, including through the supply of arms or related materiel.

source: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm551>

Al Somoud Brigade reports the arrival of the shipment on its Facebook page to inform its supporters.



Source: Al Somoud Brigade Facebook post¹⁵

14 <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2214456055269695&set=pb.100001159674428.-2207520000.&type=3&theater>
https://www.facebook.com/ashraf.mami/videos/vb.100001159674428/2174772555904712/?type=2&video_source=user_video_tab

15 <https://www.facebook.com/%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-2383067438376999/>

Mohammed Bin Ghazi would be affiliated with Al Marsa Brigade, which had reported also the delivery according to Almarsad.co. That could indicate this shipment was split between different militias.



Source: Facebook page of Al Marsa Brigade¹⁶

Finally identifying the shipment's recipients allow us to confirm from start to finish the violation by Turkey of the arms embargo. By supporting and supplying a side in the Libyan conflict, OSINT techniques can demonstrate how Turkey contributes to aggravating the conflict and undermining political stabilization efforts.

¹⁶ https://www.facebook.com/%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A_%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AA_-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B7-446658106140019/

1.4. A commercial Moldovan flag vessel: MV AMAZON

Videos and photos show the boat's name Amazon, IMO 7702657¹⁷. The vessel can carry the equivalent of 450 cars with a net tonnage of 450. It can ship big volumes.



With a Moldovan flag at the time of deliveries in Libya, Moldova has since revoked¹⁸ its pavilion (flag). The ship changed to a Togolese flag, then to a Mongolian flag with the new name Nadezhda.



Source : MarineTraffic

¹⁷ <https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:148324/mmsi:457090000/imo:7702657/vessel:NADEZHDA>

¹⁸ <http://www.maritimebulletin.net/2019/05/29/moldova-suspended-flag-registry-of-turkish-ro-ro-carrying-arms-to-libya/>

Searching on Equasis allows us to trace Nadezhda's ownership. Before 2019 and its change of names and pavilion, AMAZON belonged to Maya RORO SA and has AKDENIZ RORO DENIZ TASIMA listed as commercial manager.

NADEZHDA RORO INC	ISM Manager	since 19/10/2019	IHS Maritime
NADEZHDA RORO INC	Ship manager/Commercial manager	since 19/10/2019	IHS Maritime
NADEZHDA RORO INC	Registered owner	since 19/10/2019	IHS Maritime
AKDENIZ RORO DENIZ TASIMA	ISM Manager	since 27/03/2014	IHS Maritime
AKDENIZ RORO DENIZ TASIMA	Ship manager/Commercial manager	since 27/03/2014	IHS Maritime
MAYA RORO SA	Registered owner	since 17/03/2014	IHS Maritime
KALYONCU RO RO DENIZCILIK	ISM Manager	since 11/12/2010	IHS Maritime
KEYSTONE SHIPPING EXCHANGE INC	Registered owner	since 07/12/2010	IHS Maritime
KALYONCU RO RO DENIZCILIK	Ship manager/Commercial manager	since 07/12/2010	IHS Maritime

source: Equasis

2. A journey including the collection of the Turkish tactical vehicles at their manufacturing site

By using MarineTraffic's data, it is possible to trace the journey of AMAZON from Samsun Port to Tripoli Port.

7702657	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2019-05-20 10:26 UTC	2d 1h 35m	SAMSUN	TR	-	-	-	Chargé Partielle
7702657	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2019-05-18 08:51 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	DIKILI ANCH	Chargé
7702657	DEPARTURE	Port	IZMIR	TR	2019-05-15 10:04 UTC	13h 7m	-	-	-	-	-	Chargé
7702657	ARRIVAL	Port	IZMIR	TR	2019-05-14 20:57 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	DIKILI ANCH	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	DIKILI ANCH	TR	2019-05-14 16:07 UTC	20h 41m	-	-	-	-	-	En Lest
7702657	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	DIKILI ANCH	TR	2019-05-13 19:26 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	CANAKKALE A...	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	CANAKKALE ...	TR	2019-05-13 12:29 UTC	16h 7m	-	-	-	-	-	En Lest
7702657	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	CANAKKALE ...	TR	2019-05-12 20:22 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	ISTANBUL AN...	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Canal	CANAKKALE	TR	2019-05-12 18:09 UTC	11h 16m	-	-	-	-	-	En Lest
7702657	ARRIVAL	Canal	CANAKKALE	TR	2019-05-12 06:53 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	ISTANBUL AN...	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	ISTANBUL A...	TR	2019-05-11 18:31 UTC	11h 25m	-	-	-	-	-	En Lest
7702657	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	ISTANBUL A...	TR	2019-05-11 07:06 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	SAMSUN	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Canal	ISTANBUL	TR	2019-05-11 06:41 UTC	1h 27m	-	-	-	-	-	En Lest
7702657	ARRIVAL	Canal	ISTANBUL	TR	2019-05-11 05:14 UTC	-	-	-	SAMSUN	TR	SAMSUN	En Lest
7702657	DEPARTURE	Port	SAMSUN	TR	2019-05-09 18:52 UTC	8d 2h 32m	TRIPOLI	LY	-	-	-	En Lest

source: Traffic Marine

It is interesting to note the vessel starts its journey on May 9th 2019. We notice a 13 hours stop-over empty at Izmir Port probably to load vehicles as a BMC Otomotiv factory is established there.



BMC manufacturing plant location

On Facebook we also manage to find some of the Amazon crew members by looking for photos of the ship. By clicking on the profile of the man who posted this photo, we understand he is a sailor and has been navigating on this boat since 2018. Looking at who likes his photos and who appears on some ship photos we can identify additional members of the sea crew¹⁹.



Exploring some of the crew profiles it is possible to identify one crew member who seems to have travelled to Libya, posting a picture on May 18th, 2019 with the comment “Libia forever”.

¹⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1148836961930230&set=pb.100004118113211.-2207520000..&type=3&theater> and <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=924093421096520&set=pb.100004876118533.-2207520000..&type=3&theater>



3. A shipping company officially transporting fruits and vegetable involved in other illegal arms shipments


Based on the Equasis database, AMAZON belongs to the MAYA RORO company at the time of the vehicle delivery in Libya. Located at Kat 4, Ataturk Bulvari 140, Kale Mah, Ilkadim, 55030 Samsun, Turkey, this is actually the same address as the entity Akdeniz Roro Deniz Tasimaciligi Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sti. After additional online research on the company, it appears to be linked as a subsidiary to Kalyoncu group (articles here and here). A video published on Kalyoncu group Youtube account in 2015 showcases its shipping activities, displaying images of AKDENIZ RORO and AMAZON vessel.





source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=drG_l8X6mcU


On its LinkedIn page and its website, KALYONCU group introduces itself as a company created in 1993 by the Kalyoncu family and specialized in fruit and vegetable export. Later on, the company developed a fresh product shipping capacity and offers this service worldwide.




Source : <http://www.kalyoncunakliyat.com>

Until 2019 its subsidiary, ADKENIZ RORO, owned a fleet of other vessels, including the boat URAL (IMO 7725386), which have all been since transferred then to a new entity called ALESTA RORO GEMI ACENTELIGI. Since 2019, all the ships have been transferred to new corporate entities making it harder to link them to the ultimate beneficiary Kalyoncu.


Corporate structure until 2019



Corporate structure since 2019



We can link the new entity Alesta Roro to Kalyoncu group thanks to its manager Ahmet Yilmaz, who is also working for Kalyoncu Group as per his twitter account.



Source: dnb.com



Ahmet Yılmaz
@ahmetyl15727251
Kalyoncu Grup Akdeniz Ro Ro Deniz Taşımacılığı Co.
📍 Samsun, Türkiye 🌐 akdenizroro.com
📅 Joined February 2018
32 Following 33 Followers

In addition to fruit and vegetable deliveries and Turkish arms shipment to Libya, it appears Kalyoncu has experience in transporting military equipment. In 2018, URAL vessel was stopped at Sfax Port in Tunisia by local customs for inspection. They discovered Russian vehicles and military equipment on board. It is unclear if the containers were destined to Libya or mercenaries like the security company Wagner.²⁰



source : <http://www.maritimebulletin.net/2018/02/16/secret-russian-arms-shipment-cargo-ship-with-arms-detained-in-tunisia/>

20 <https://insurancemarineneews.com/insurance-marine-news/cargo-ship-ural-mysteries-continue/>
<https://www.shemsfm.net/amp/fr/actualites-tunisie-news-news-nationales/188416/exclusif-les-equipements-saisis-a-bord-du-navire-russe-video>

 **Christiaan Triebert** ✓
@trbrtc

Similar Ural military trucks were spotted on board of a Turkish vessel in February 2018, @CITeam_en found. That ship belonged to Akdeniz RoRo, a company which has been shipping cargo from #Russia to #Syria since at least 2016, as @YorukIsik has documented.

 **Yörük Işık** ✓ @YorukIsik · Jul 8, 2016
Samsun based Kalyoncu's Panama flag Ro-Ro Ural transited Bosphorus en route from #Tuapse #Russia to #Latakia #Syria



1:24 AM · Apr 25, 2018 · Twitter Web Client

3 Retweets 7 Likes

source : <https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/988936628554162176>

Case study: ER-BAJ

On December 14th, 2019, a pro Libyan National Army (LNA) Twitter account publishes a video showing strikes led by General Haftar army the day before. According to this pro-LNA account these strikes were targeting a shipment transported from Turkey to the airport of Misrata by a 747 Boeing some time before.

OpenFacto has been able to analyse the circumstances surrounding the strikes with open-sources. Several elements are suggesting that the claim from the LNA these strikes were aiming at destroying arms delivered from Turkey are plausible:

- The strikes were targeting warehouses located within the airport.
- A 747 Boeing 747 from Turkey did land at Misrata airport a few days before the attack.

A deeper open-source analysis reveals the existence of recurring aviation liaisons between Turkey and Libya, operated by civil aviation companies involved in arms trafficking in the past:

- A Libyan company, GASG/Global Air Transport, chartered the plane 747 Boeing and is known to have transported arms in Libya but also in Somalia,
- The plane's owner is a Moldavian company, Aerotranscargo, accused of having delivered weapons in Libya and Syria in the past.

OpenFacto believes these air liaisons could be used by Turkey to provide military equipment to the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Fayeze el-Sarraj based on these circumstantial evidence which is in violation of the arms embargo on Libya.

1. Strikes on GNA controlled Misrata airport aimed at destroying hangars deemed to be storing Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones by the LNA on December 13th 2019.

1.1. LNA claims strikes responsibility with the objective to destroy Bayraktar TB2 drones storage

We find online the claim of the strikes on Misrata airport in a letter published by the General Command of the LNA armed forces. He warns against deliveries of weapons from Turkey by air and sea under the support agreement Turkey signed with Tripoli in November 2019 and explains that the bombing targeted the warehouses where the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones were stored.



LNA Spox. @spoxlna · Dec 14, 2019

Statement by the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces on the targeting of military locations in the city of Misurata.

Statement by the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces on the targeting of military locations in the city of Misurata

After careful tracking and analysis of continuous intelligence reports on large shipments of weapons, munitions, armored vehicles and various military equipment arriving from various Turkish sea and air ports...

these shipments were targeted in their storage locations and destroyed successfully and accurately resulting in continuous explosions and the burning of Turkish drones hangars, our fighters returned safely to base.

The General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces informs the International Community, the Libyan people, and the residents of Misrata that we have also tracked the arrival, transportation, and storage of Turkish military shipments in civilian locations unfit for storing extremely dangerous weapons, munitions, and equipment. Some of these locations belong to commercial companies, some of...

...were destroyed previously only to reappear again today. Another sign of this public Turkish support appeared in another sickening form when the heroes of the Libyan Army were able to destroy new models of the Turkish armored vehicle Kirpi using AP weapons.

Based on this information and reconnaissance the Libyan Air Force carefully planned to target the storage locations for TB2 drones in the Military Air Academy in Misrata, required provisions to carry out this mission were prepared by the Libyan Air Force. And this night, by Allah's grace,

...the Libyan Arab Armed Forces warns against breaking these laws and then coming out with false statement claiming that the Libyan Army has targeted civilian locations without objective and professional investigations.

The General Command also notifies the international community that we have obtained accurate intelligence on new shipments of Turkish military equipment on board Turkish military and civilians ships alongside ships from other nationalities as well. Some have already departed from Turkish ports headed to ports in Misrata, Tripoli, and

12 50 99

Source : https://twitter.com/spoxlna/status/1205792679180800000?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwtterm%5E1205792679180800000&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fopenfacto.fr%2Fcabine-or-hold-transporting-arms-by-air%2F

« The Libyan Air Force carefully planned to target the storage locations for TB2 drones in the Military Air Academy in Misrata »

There are other videos and photos posted by pro-LNA accounts that report this incident. A photo posted online on December 13th announces the imminent attack on the airport:



M.LNA @LNA2019M



#LNA airforce conducting heavy air strike on #mistata airbase #Now #Libya #GNa



17 19:10 - 13 déc. 2019



Voir les autres Tweets de M.LNA



source : <https://twitter.com/LNA2019M/status/1205550477569646596>

A photo and video of the strikes were then published, including a tweet about the destruction of containers transported by a 747 Boeing from Turkey:

 **M.LNA**
@LNA2019M

#Misrata after #LNA airstrike on a cargo of a Boeing 747 coming from #Turkey.



151 20:22 - 13 déc. 2019

92 personnes parlent à ce sujet

source : <https://twitter.com/LNA2019M/status/1205568717352054785>

 **M.LNA**
@LNA2019M

A video showing the seventh strike on the airbase in #Misrata after the #LNA conducted airstrikes tonight

← Tweet

indicate that the full cargo of the Boeing 747 was destroyed With a death toll of +20 including non #Libyan #Turkey



5.5K views 0:17 / 0:21

11:00 PM · Dec 13, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

17 Retweets 33 Likes

source : <https://twitter.com/LNA2019M/status/1205623578730860544>

A reverse image search shows that the first image is from November 2019 and was already published on Facebook:



The publication of an old photo to illustrate the imminent attack as if it was taken on the spot invites us to be careful about the information disseminated online by pro-LNA accounts around this event.

The other videos of the strikes seem to have been put online for the first time in December 2019.

The description of a video posted online on December 19th details the targets that would have been struck by the LNA: a Turkish air defence system, 3 ammunition caches, military vehicles by the Turkish industrial BMC and a container full of 12.5mm machine guns.



M.LNA
@LNA2019M



May the midnight sun always shine on you. #Misrata #LNA
Targets

- 1) a new #Turkish air defense system not yet installed.
- 2) 3 ammunition caches.
- 3) A group of #BMC vehicles.
- 4) A container full of 12.5mm Machine guns.#Libya



57 20:45 - 19 déc. 2019



35 personnes parlent à ce sujet



Source : <https://twitter.com/LNA2019M/status/1207748881066405888>

OpenFacto sought to verify in open-sources whether the LNA strikes were indeed aimed at destroying weapons delivered by Turkey.

1.2. Damages to warehouses can be spotted on satellite images

Thanks to Google Earth satellite imagery history, we can see damage caused by the strikes by comparing images from December 13 during the day, a few hours before the strikes, with those from December 20.



More strikes at the end of December destroyed the remaining hangars:



Aldin @aldin_ww · 21 déc. 2019



En réponse à @aldin_ww

On previous imagery from Dec. 12 only two of the shelters were destroyed.

Imagery: @obretix





source : <https://twitter.com/obretix/status/1210307965280018441>

This verification confirms that it was indeed warehouses that were targeted by the December 13th strikes on Misrata airport complex.

2. A 747 boeing commercial cargo travelled from Turkey to Misrata on December 13th

From September 1st to December 12th, Mitiga Airport in Tripoli was closed after suffering severe damage following General Haftar's air strikes. During this period, Misrata Airport took the role as a strategic airport for the GNA. As a window to the outside world, Misrata Airport was for several months the only civilian airport in the region, from which Libyan airliners, Libyan airlines Afriqiyah Airlines, Libyan Wings and Libyan Airlines, as well as cargo lines, Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG), Buraq Air and Afriqiyah Airlines, operated.

On December 13, 2019, Google Earth shows a plane resembling a Boeing 747 loading or unloading cargo at Misrata Airport:



Satellite images of Misrata airport on Google Earth on December 13th, 2019



Photo of the ER-BAJ plane taken on December 7th, 2019. Source: [Jetphotos](#)

It is most likely **ER-BAJ**, a Boeing 747 that was at Misrata Airport on that date according to Flightradar.24 The yellow and red colours of the aircraft, visible on the satellite image, match those of **ER-BAJ**.

Flight history for aircraft - ER-BAJ								
AIRCRAFT		TYPE CODE		MODE S				
Boeing 747-412(BDSF)		B744		504E4D				
AIRLINE		Code		SERIAL NUMBER (MSN)				
Aerotrascargo		-		27071				
OPERATOR		Code		AGE (Nov 1995)				
-		-		24 years				
13 Dec 2019	Istanbul (SAW)	Misrata (MRA)	(GAK3013)	2:16	12:08	09:51	—	Landed 11:07
12 Dec 2019	Misrata (MRA)	Istanbul (SAW)	(GAK3012)	2:43	19:56	17:12	—	Landed 20:55

Flightradar24


3. Are there two pilots in the plane? Aerotrascargo flying a recurring line to Libya often chartered by GASG Libyan company

Flightradar24 database, above, gives us information about **ER-BAJ**:

- Plane type : Boeing 747-412.
- Serial number (MSN)²¹, unique plane identification : 27071.
- Airline : here **Aerotrascargo**.
- Call sign²²: a registered code for the aviation authority and identification of the company operating the flight.

A closer look at the ER-BAJ's flight history shows the use of call signs beginning with **ATG**, but sometimes with **GAK**, followed by a sequence of numbers. Over the past year, the ER-BAJ used this call sign only on December 12 and 13 to fly to Libya. Searching a database of call signs, we come across the Libyan company **Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG)**.

Thus, during these flights, the **ER-BAJ** aircraft, usually operated by **Aerotrascargo**, was operated by **GASG**.



Global Aviation and Services Group
✈ Airline Information

ICAO: GAK

→ **Callsign** AVIAGROUP

📍 **Country** Libya

airlinecodes.info

The website [Aerotrascargo.org](http://www.aerotrascargo.org)²³, a database containing aircraft registration information from more than 60 countries, confirms that **ER-BAJ** is operated by Aerotrascargo, a Moldovan company with a fleet of several aircraft.

21 http://www.aerotrascargo.org/php/go.php?action=definition_msn

22 <https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/clearing-up-call-sign-confusion/>

23 <https://aerotrascargo.org/>

Airframes Profile for: [Fleet list of Aerotrans Cargo](#)

Airframes 1-54 of 14 - [[Generate Excel](#)]

Reg'n	Type	MSN	sn	Engines	MTOW	Config	Built	at	Operator	In	Out	Owners	Origin	Became	Status	Termin ^{ed}	Remarks	TT	TC	Selcal	Hex	
ER-IAW	B-76TD	73479367	6002				31/07/1987	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex EY-702 @ Khatlon Air	To (Sky Prim Air Sky Prim Air)	Active							
ER-IAV	B-76TD	63471150	5408				1986	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex 3X-GFR @ GR Avia	Stored (at FJR)	Stored at FJR	31/12/2008	no titles					
ER-IAP	B-76TD	63470088	5302				30/06/1986	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex EY-701 @ Khatlon Air	To (Sky Prim Air ER-IAR)	Stored							
ER-IAN	B-76TD	53464934	4904				1985	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex EW-343TH @ Trans Avia Export Cargo AL	To (Abakan Avia RA-76463)	Active							
ER-IBA	B-76T	3427796	2009				20/11/1980	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex EK-76602 @ Ark AW	To (Trans Avia Export Cargo Airlines EW-76709)	Preserved	06/2009	no titles					
ER-IAF	B-76T	3423699	1805				1980	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex 4L-SKL @ Sky Georgia	To (Yuzhmashavia LR-CPV)	Active		no titles					
ER-	B.747-4H6F(SCD)	28434	1371				20/02/2006	PAE	Aerotrans Cargo				ex 9M-MPR @ Malaysia AL - Acquisition cancelled	(n/a)	Cancelled							
ER-EBJ	B.747-412F(SCD)	28558	1173				26/08/1998	PAE	Aerotrans Cargo				ex 9V-SFG @ Singapore AL Cargo	(Current, Active)	Active		no titles					
ER-IBZ	B-76T	63414432	1108				01/08/1978	UTTP	Aerotrans Cargo				ex EK-76603 @ Ark AW	Stored (at FJR)	Stored at FJR							
ER-IAJ	B.747-412(BDSF)	28562	1074				09/02/1996	PAE	Aerotrans Cargo				ex N743WA @ Southern Air	(Current, Active)	Active		no titles					
ER-BAJ	Recently updated, data embargoed for non-subscribers																					
ER-BAM	Recently updated, data embargoed for non-subscribers																					
LY-DOV	ATR-42-300(F)	5					12/12/1985	TLS	Aerotrans Cargo				wet-leased/franchised from DOT LT- Acquisition cancelled?	(Leased & Returned)	Derelict	2013	no titles					
IMLDT	F.27-250(F)	20197					04/10/1990	AMS	Aerotrans Cargo				leased from Minliner	(Leased & Returned)	Active		no titles					

Searching for other Aerotranscargo aircrafts flying to Libya with GAK call sign (thus operated by the Libyan airline GASG), we find 24 flights between May 2019 and the end of December 2019 between Turkey and Libya registered on FlightRadar.24. Most of them follow a similar pattern: a departure from Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates to Turkey (Istanbul and Trabzon) under ATG call sign (Aerotranscargo), then to Libya under GAK call sign.

ER-BBJ

29 Jan 2020	Misrata (MRA)	Ostend (OST)	(ATG4472)	3:26
29 Jan 2020	Istanbul (SAW)	Misrata (MRA)	(GAK3011)	2:56
29 Jan 2020	Sharjah (SHJ)	Istanbul (SAW)	(ATG4471)	4:13
27 Jan 2020	—	Sharjah (SHJ)	(ATG4484)	—


ER-BAJ

13 Dec 2019	Misrata (MRA)	Ostend (OST)	(ATG4474)	3:38
13 Dec 2019	Istanbul (SAW)	Misrata (MRA)	(GAK3013)	2:16
12 Dec 2019	Misrata (MRA)	Istanbul (SAW)	(GAK3012)	2:43
12 Dec 2019	Izmir (ADB)	Misrata (MRA)	(ATG4473)	1:58
12 Dec 2019	Sharjah (SHJ)	Izmir (ADB)	(ATG4473)	4:30

ER-BAM

15 May 2019	Misrata (MRA)	Trabzon (TZX)	(ATG2278)
14 May 2019	Istanbul (SAW)	Misrata (MRA)	(GAK3011)
14 May 2019	Sharjah (SHJ)	—	—
14 May 2019	Sharjah (SHJ)	—	—
14 May 2019	Sharjah (SHJ)	—	—
14 May 2019	Sharjah (SHJ)	—	—

Number of flights with GAK call sign used by Aerotranscargo planes from May to December 2019:



In addition, from November 2019 to April 2020, ER-BBJ has accumulated more than 20 flights to and from Libya under ATG call sign (Aetrostrascargo) via Ostend (Belgium) and Algiers (Algeria). Articles in Africa Intelligence Online of 2016 mention that Aerotranscargo would have operated in one year more than 50 flights to Misrata and Mitiga from the airports of Ostend (Belgium), Cologne (Germany), or Trabzon and Istanbul (Turkey), thanks to a Boeing 747 air freighter.

Without customs documents or photos showing the opening of containers or pallets, it is impossible to identify the cargo on the **ER-BAJ** plane, or even to be certain that it was its cargo that the LNA strikes were aimed at.

Nevertheless, it is clear that **Aerotranscargo** has established recurrent air liaison between Turkey and Libyan GNA-controlled territories.

4. A common link between GASG and Aerostrascargo: Emirati tarmac

A common link between **Global Aviation and Services Group** and **Aerostrascargo**? Tarmacs in the middle of the Emirati desert.

4.1. Aerostrascargo, on the Moldavian trail

With a quick look on the company's website we can find the planes fleet identified in the different routes to Libya.

The screenshot shows the Aerostrascargo website's 'Fleet Information' page. At the top, there is a red header with the 'atc' logo and 'AEROTRASCARGO' text. To the right, there are three contact points: 'Operation Office Sharjah, UAE +971 6 574 1744', 'Head office Chisinau, Moldova +373 22 526 813', and 'E-Mail Contact info@atc-md.aero'. Below this is a dark navigation bar with links: HOME, COMPANY, SERVICES, GLOBAL, COMPLIANCE, OUR NETWORK, CAREERS, E-PORTAL, CONTACT US. The main content area has a large image of a Boeing 747-400 aircraft with the text 'Fleet Information' overlaid. Below this, there are four smaller images of aircraft, each with a label and type: ER-BAM (Type: 747-400 BDSF), ER-JAI (Type: 747-400 BDSF), ER-BBJ (Type: 747-400F), and ER-BAJ (Type: 747-400 BDSF).

Source: <https://www.atc-md.aero/>

The aviation transport company was founded in 2011 by Mihail Șcemeliov. He has been managing two other companies in the aviation sector: **Air Stork** and **Technoær**.

The screenshot shows a search results page for Mihail Șcemeliov. At the top, there is a search bar with the text 'Company, IDNO, VAT, CEOs, founders ...' and a search icon. Below the search bar, there is a section for 'Name' with the result 'Șcemeliov Mihail'. Underneath, there are two columns: 'Administrator' and 'Founder'. The 'Administrator' column lists three entries: 'Societatea Cu Răspundere Limitată Aerostrascargo', 'Compania Aeriană Air Stork Societate Cu Răspundere Limitată', and 'Societatea Cu Răspundere Limitată Tehnoær'. The 'Founder' column lists three entries: 'Societatea Cu Răspundere Limitată Aerostrascargo', 'Compania Aeriană Air Stork Societate Cu Răspundere Limitată', and 'Societatea Cu Răspundere Limitată Tehnoær'.

Source: <https://srl.md/en/person/scemeliov-mihail>

4.2. An operational base in the UAE

This is the only Moldavian aviation cargo company²⁴ authorized to fly in the European air space since 2019. Aerotranscargo is specialized in cargo transport all over the world. While its headquarters are located in Moldova, its website indicates a subsidiary dedicated to operations based in Sharjah in the UAE. We discover that Aerotranscargo seems to be locally known under two entities with one having a different name: Aerotranscargo FZE and Aviation Transport Services FZE.

A profile on the regional job market social network BAYT shows the two companies mentioned together. Looking a bit more we discover they share the same address and phone number in Sharjah.



Assistant Flight Dispatcher
Aero Trans Cargo Airlines, UAE (Aviation Transport Services FZE)

Lieu: Émirats Arabes Unis - Dubaï
Education: Baccalauréat, Physics
Expérience: 14 années, 10 mois

Connectez Message Plus

BAYT account

CONTACT - AVIATION TRANSPORT SERVICES FZE

Q4/174, Saif Zone
P.O. Box No. 122487
Sharjah

United Arab Emirates

Call the company

Fax +971 6 5741749

<http://www.atsfze.com>

OPERATION OFFICE

Q4/174 , Saif Zone
P.O.Box 122487
Sharjah, UAE

(+971)- 6-574-1744


info@atc-md.aero

+971 6 574 1749

source : <https://ae.kompass.com/c/aviation-transport-services-fze/ae807266/>

²⁴ <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/04/18/moldova-promises-action-as-eu-bans-11-airlines/>

Same address, same phone number in Sharjah for Aviation Transport Services FZE and the address mentioned on Aerotranscargo's website.



Website	https://www.atc-md.aero/
Industry	Airlines/Aviation
Company size	201-500 employees 35 on LinkedIn
Headquarters	SAIF Zone, Sharjah

Aerotranscargo LinkedIn Account <https://www.linkedin.com/company/aerotranscargo-fze>

This could confirm the route scheme observed earlier with planes stationed in Sharjah, the company's operations base. As an operator approved by the EU and other foreign aviation authorities **Aerotranscargo** can rent its certificates and planes to other companies. Looking at other call signs on route historic, we can see other clients apart from **GASG** in Libya like Bismillah airlines in Bangladesh.

4.3. Global Aviation and Services Group, a Libyan transporter

The Libyan company **Global Aviation and Services Group** was created in 2003 by a Libyan businessman, Captain Abdusallam Ibrahim Aradi. It put in place a weekly liaison with Turkey and Ostend in Belgium thanks to **Aerotranscargo** chartering services. We can use the company's social networks to identify Abdusallam Ibrahim Aradi on a photo taken on the occasion of the signature of a new partnership.



Mr. Prakash Noronha, Mr. David J. Dacquino shaking hands with Capt. A. Aradi & Mr. Nouman Nazir.



Source: Facebook²⁵


In 2015 or 2016, the company is renamed **Global Air Transport**, but keeps for a while the two brands on its promotional material.



Source: Facebook

25 <https://www.facebook.com/516279425109347/photos/a.525171767553446/615805521823403/?type=3&theater>
52

The company is presented on its website as an aviation company catering for cargo and passengers. We can have an idea of goods volume options thanks to some delivery photos: cars, big pallets.



Source: Facebook²⁶

On **GASG** Facebook account we can find photos of Aerotranscargo's planes, like this one of the **ER-BBJ**.



Source: Facebook²⁷

A Facebook post points out to headquarters located in the UAE, offering an integrated cargo solutions via a company called **Quick Link**.

26 <https://www.facebook.com/Global-Air-516279425109347/>

27 <https://www.facebook.com/Global-Air-516279425109347/>



We can find a link between **GASG** and **Quick Link Aviation Services FZC** on an employment website in the UAE. The entity's role is clearly detailed: **Quick Link Aviation** is a commercial agent for aviation fret on behalf of **GASG** in Libya.



Quick Link Aviation Services FZC

P.O.B. 9340 Executive Suite Z2-48, Sharjah International Airport , United Arab Emirates

51 - 100 | Transportation

<https://www.quicklinkaviation.com>

Overview

Jobs (1)

Reviews

Company Description

History of Quick Link

Since its inception on January 10, 2005, Quick Link Aviation Services has sustained its position as a vibrant and reliable player in the aviation sector globally. This has been demonstrated through the provision of distinctive and innovative services. Originally located in Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Quick Link Aviation's expansion by opening an office in Dubai is a testament to its growth. The expansion which will usher in a wide range of services will further cater to the airfreight needs of its ever increasing clientele.

"Quick enough to link...excellent enough to deliver" has been the guiding principle of our company. With this, we believe we can cope with the challenges and requirements of the dynamic global market. Having expert knowledge of the routes, airlines and the local facilities, we're confident that we will provide our clients and prospective ones quicker, professional and more efficient services at competitive rates. Today, Quick Link Aviation is the General Sales Agent (GSA) of Libya-based Global Aviation and Services Group, a cargo and passenger airline. As the GSA of Global Aviation and Services Group, our company is forging ahead by offering its numerous clients dedicated and timely services with innovations focused on meeting the varied needs of our clients, we are able to stay one step ahead of dynamic market developments and be better prepared to meet the growing demands of each new day.

Source: <https://bossjob.ph/company/quick-link-aviation-services-fzc-17735>

We understand the commercial and transactional relations between **Aerotranscargo** and **GASG** could have taken place in Sharjah.

5. Tarnished reputations in the past

5.1. Aerotranscargo : an alleged arms transporter to Syria and Libya

Aerotranscargo's reputation was quite damaged by some investigations published in the media but also conducted by the UN panel of experts.

On April 15th 2015 a Belgian newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws²⁸ relied on Libyan sources and the UN panel of experts reports to confirm **Aerotranscargo** was transporting arms from Ostend to Libya destined to armed groups fighting against Tripoli government. A UN panel of experts's report²⁹ published on February 23rd, 2015 was indeed referring to arms delivery from Belgium and the UAE to Libyan airports including those controlled by GNA loyalists.

²⁸ <https://www.hln.be/nieuws/binnenland/-illegale-wapentrafiiek-van-oostende-naar-libie~a9cf652b/>

²⁹ <https://www.undocs.org/S/2015/128>

On July 27th 2016 [OCCRP](#)³⁰ released an investigation on arms transfers from the Balkans and Eastern Europe to Syria via the UAE, Turkey and Jordan. The consortium published exclusive flight [documents](#)³¹ listing what was inside **Aerotrascargo ER-BAM** plane in the summer of 2015. On June 30th and July 14th, 2015 the plane would have carried dangerous goods packaged by several employees from the Belgian logistics company Aviapartner from Ostend to Misrata. The plane would have also transported arms from Saudi Arabia.

In 2017, the UN panel of experts³² reported that the company's services were used to ship several times military equipment and some personalities to support Marichal Hafter's side.

5.2. The Aradi's clan alleged links to the GAN and a few services for the LNA

Global Aviation and Services Group has also suffered from being accused of arms trafficking several times. In 2006 the company was held responsible for delivering armoured vehicles and transporting military personal in Baidoa, Somalia in a UN Panel of Experts report³³.

E. The case of **Global Aviation and Services Group**

158. The Monitoring Group received information that on or about 27 September 2006 an IL-76 aircraft — registration number 5A-DQA, using call sign GAK-114/115 — operated by Global Aviation, based in Tripoli, landed at Baidoa. The aircraft had departed from Kufra, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Transported on the aircraft were two bullet-proof vehicles for President Yusuf, and the passengers on the aircraft included senior officers of the Ugandan military.

159. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 5 October 2006 to the Managing Director of Global Aviation notifying him of the above information and seeking his response. The Monitoring Group received a reply from Global Aviation, dated 12 October 2006, which included a copy of two different airway bills. However, the reply did not include other important documentation and information requested by the Monitoring Group. As a result, the investigation continues.

The UN panel of experts on Libya has also mentioned **GASG** in its latest report³⁴ published in December 2016. On July 26th, 2019 the company had chartered a plane from **Deek Aviation**, owned by a UAE based businessman called Jaideep Mirchandani. The plane was hit by the GNA on Jufra aviation base which controlled by the LNA for having transported military equipment destined to the LNA.

In addition, the company could have some political ties with Tripoli. In March 2015 the company published a press release³⁵ signed by its CEO Abdul Salam Al-Aradi denying the control of an individual named Abdul Razag Al-Aradi in the company's shareholding.

30 <https://www.occrp.org/en/makingakilling/making-a-killing/>

31 <https://www.undocs.org/S/2015/128>

32 <https://www.undocs.org/S/2017/466>

33 <https://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/109th/S2006913.pdf>

34 <https://undocs.org/S/2019/914>

35 <https://www.facebook.com/Global-Air-516279425109347/>

Global Aviation And Services Group



المجموعة العالمية للطيران والخدمات

2015/03/22
طرابلس - ليبيا

بيان صحفي عاجل

اتعدنا اليوم إجتماع طارئ لمجلس الإدارة ومدراء الاقسام وتم إصدار البيان التالي :-
شركة المجموعة العالمية للطيران والخدمات تنفي الخبر الذي نشر يوم الأس من طرف بعض وسائل الاعلام المحليه والذي يورط مجموعتنا في نقل السلاح وربط ملكية الشركة بالسيد / عبدالرزاق العرادي .
ونحن هنا نؤكد بأن ملكية الشركة لاتتبع إلى السيد المذكور اعلاه والشركة لم ولن تتورط في اي اعمال عسكرية مهما كان شكلها مع العلم بأن نشاطاتنا تجارية و انسانية بحتة.

كابتن/عبدالسلام ابراهيم الراعي
رئيس مجلس الإدارة

Date :22/03/2015
Tripoli - Libya

Urgent Press Release

Our company has held an urgent meeting today regarding the false news and issued the following statement: -

Global Aviation & Services Group denies the news published yesterday by some local media outlets, which implicates our group in the transport of weapons and linking ownership of the company with, Mr. / Abdul Razak Al-Aradi.

We hereby confirm that the ownership of the company has no any relationship to the name mentioned above and the company has not and will not get involved in any military acts in whatever form with the knowledge that our activities are commercial and humanitarian only.

Captain /Abdul Salam Al-Aradi
Chairman

Tel: + 218 21 351 4068/69 Fax: + 218 21 351 4071 SITA: TIPGGXH P.O.Box: 2828 Tripoli- Libya
www.global-aviationgroup.com info@global-aviationgroup.com

Global Air
· 22 mars 2015

بيان صحفي عاجل
Urgent Press Release

2015/22/03
Afficher la suite ...

Voir la traduction

44 10 commentaires 19 partages

J'aime Commenter Partager

Afficher 4 autres commentaires

Eiham M Shawish
حسبي الله ونعم الوكيل فيهم ..الكاتب عبد السلام العرادي من انطف وأشرف الناس و من اولاد البلاد . كل حد معروف في مكانه ..
J'aime · Répondre · Voir la traduction · 5 ans

Eiham M Shawish
حسبي الله ونعم الوكيل فيهم . ناس معنדה ما تصنع غير الفتنة والكذب .
J'aime · Répondre · Voir la traduction · 5 ans

Nuri Abuain
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم / قل هاتوا برهانكم إن كنتم صادقين
J'aime · Répondre · Voir la traduction · 5 ans

احمد العرادي
حسبي الله ونعم الوكيل فيهم .
J'aime · Répondre · Voir la traduction · 5 ans

Noha Mohammad
حسبي الله ونعم الوكيل فيهم، اللهم أشعلهم في أنفسهم وسلط عليهم سيف إنقام
J'aime · Répondre · Voir la traduction · 5 ans

Mahmud El-Rb

Votre commentaire...

Touchez Entrée pour publier votre commentaire.



This individual is a representative of the Justice and Constrution Party, close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya and an ex member of the National Transitional Council. He is allegedly close to Sarraj.



Maghreb Conf. report: AbdulRazag ElAradi is Seraj's "new US lobbyist". US was instrumental in getting his brother's charges dismissed by UAE.

3:43 PM · May 5, 2016 · Twitter for iPhone

According to Africa Intelligence³⁶, these two persons would be cousins and the Aradi clan a very important family in Libya. On Facebook we can only see Abdulrazag Aradi's and **GASG** commercial director Nizar Aradi's contacts. Both of them have a friend in common, Mohammed Aradi, which seems to be a weak link.



source : Nizar Aradi's Facebook profile with GASG CEO contact and Mohamed Aradi

From one side or the other, the two companies seem to have supported one or the other army in Libya by concluding cargo shipping agreement. By shipping from Turkey to Misrata a GNA-controlled airport in December 2019, the two companies have allegedly positioned themselves for Turkey/GNA this time.

36 <https://www.africaintelligence.fr/aif/insiders/libye/2016/04/28/abdelhakim-belhadj-des-milices-de-mitiga-au-business-international/108146711-be1>

6. UAE ban on Moldavian cargo planes and OSINT limits of this analysis

On February 1st, 2020 Emirati aviation authorities implemented a ban on Moldavian cargo planes flights from/to the UAE officially on safety grounds. This new regulation must have had a direct impact on **Aerotranscargo** and **Global Air/Global Aviation and Services Group** cargo operations to Libya. One can wonder if the UAE has used safety as a pretext to kick out a company used mainly by the Libyan side the country does not support.

The UAE's General Civil Aviation Authority wrote to Moldova's equivalent authority, the MCAA, on 19 January, noting "in the interest of aviation safety and in accordance with Article 4 of the Air Service Agreement ... the UAE GCAA has decided to ban all operations of cargo aircraft from the republic of Moldova to/from UAE airports, until further notice".

Source: <https://theloadstar.com/uae-bans-moldovan-cargo-operators-from-its-airports-citing-safety-fears/>

The analysis of open-sources is faced with some limits. It is impossible to notice and record banned equipment without the existence of leaks or whistle blowers giving access to some missing pieces like photos and custom documentations.

Case study: MV SINGLE EAGLE

Mitiga airport, located 11km from Tripoli in Libya was hit on January 5th, 2020 by bombings³⁷ from General Haftar's side. The airport was supposed to cater only for civilian passengers, representing a strategic link to the outside world. Yet several sources close to the LNA suggested Turkish troops³⁸ were deployed within the airport to support the GNA. In January 2020, videos started circulating on social networks showing a new Turkish anti-aircraft defence system transported from Tripoli and deployed on Mitiga airport premises. The LNA spokesperson commented on these videos on January 18th.



#طرابلس #ليبيا

استمرار وصول الدعم العسكري التركي للحشد الميليشياوي العثماني .
فيديو من أمام ميناء طرابلس البحري وتحت حماية ميليشيات الردع ..



410 00:33 - 17 janv. 2020

248 personnes parlent à ce sujet



First documented appearance of #Turkish recent military aid to #GNA - we see here MIM-23 Hawk medium-range surface-to-air missiles along with AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D radar in #Mitiga air base in #Tripoli #Libya



82 07:23 - 17 janv. 2020

75 personnes parlent à ce sujet

37 <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/mitiga-airport-suspends-air-traffic-twice-less-6-hours>

38 <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/2109676/libyan-national-army-turkey-building-secret-military-base-tripoli's-mitiga>



From this starting point and with the objective of establishing the chronology of events, open-sources research reveals circumstantial evidence showing:

- Turkey could be in violation of the arms embargo by delivering anti-aircraft defence equipment on the MV Single Eagle (Hawk and Korkut systems), introducing new equipment to Libya
- The ship is associated with Lebanese Abou Merhi Group's German subsidiary

1. OSINT circumstantial evidence demonstrates the delivery of a Turkish air defence system to Tripoli by a commercial ship owned by a Lebanese company

It can be challenging to produce rigorous and solid evidence using only open-sources as some key information is not available online. Nevertheless, it is possible to accumulate circumstantial evidence which provide the basis for a deeper investigation by investigators and analysts. This second research step would aim to refine and verify the facts and fill in additional gaps.

1.1. New Turkish air defence system in Libya


In this case, a video published on January 17th and images on February 11th, 2020 show an anti-aircraft defence system transported on a truck and positioned at Mitiga's airport:

 **عبدالغني على عسكر**
17 January · 🌐

نشرت تركيا أحدث مدفعها المضاد للطائرات ذاتية الدفع "Korkut" إلى ليبيا. يوضح لك مدى ثقة الأطراف في وعد وقف إطلاق النار العام لحفتر ونتائج مؤتمر برلين للسلام

Turkey has released its latest anti-aircraft gun "Korkut" to Libya. Shows how confident the parties are in the promise of the general ceasefire of nofar and the results of the Berlin peace conference

⚙️ · Hide original · Rate this translation



source: Facebook, Twitter and <https://libya24.tv/news/266101>

The video shows what seems to be a Korkut short-range air defence system, which can be identified thanks to the unique wheels and shape of the lowered canon. It consists of a one tracked armoured vehicle fitted with a 35mm twin-cannon using air burst ammunition able to destroy air-to-ground missiles, cruise missiles and UAVs. It can also be used against helicopters and fighter aircraft flying at low altitude with a maximum range of 4km. This system has been manufactured in Turkey by Aselsan³⁹ since 2016.

39 <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/en/capabilities/air-and-missile-defense-systems/self-propelled-and-air-burst-munition/korkut-self-propelled-air-defense-gun-system>



Photos from the airport seem to show a US-made mid-range anti-aircraft system with a number of component elements often fitted on wheeled trailers, making the system semi-mobile.



MIM-23 Hawk, made by the US firm Raytheon, is a medium-range surface to air missile which we can recognize by their very specific shape when sitting on their launcher units.



We can see a radar which looks like an AN MPQ 64 – a US short-range aerial defence radar, also part of the HAWK system.

Performing a reverse image search on screen shots from the video shows the images are published as of January 17th, 2020. This appears to be the first appearance of the Korkut system in Libya. This element could help us date the images and potential delivery to around January 17th, 2020.

Searching SIPRI's database for arms trade by type of system confirms Turkey acquired 8 HAWK systems (version XX1) through a licence in 2005 from the US for 100 million USD.

Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1990 to 2019

Note: The 'No. delivered' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <<http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>>.


Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 02 May 2020

Supplier/ recipient (R)	ordered	No. designation	Weapon description	Year(s) Weapon of order	Year delivery	of delivered	No. Comments
United States							
R: Turkey	14	Rapier	SAM system	1995	1996	(14)	Second-hand; aid
	8	I-HAWK	SAM system	2002	2005	(8)	Second-hand; \$100 m deal; modernized (partly in Norway) to I-HAWK PIP-3 before delivery

One can question if the suspected delivery described in our case study is in accordance with export control restrictions applied to US arms licenses.

1.2. The truck geolocated next to the Ministry of Tourism close to Tripoli Port



In the background, we can see a building with three windows and two small openings. Our hypothesis is that the truck is transporting the Korkut from the port to the airport. From this starting point, we can try to identify buildings with these specifications. A search on Google maps and a browse of associated photos in the area of the port, quickly point to the Ministry of Tourism, which seems to match the building on the video.



Ministry of Tourism



The truck went in front of the Ministry with the port to the back of the person taking the video.

1.3. A shipment transported by MV Single Eagle

Delivery is likely to have taken place by sea, given the heavy equipment. With this hypothesis in mind, we can look at vessels docked at Tripoli Port circa January 17th.

VOS TRITON	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-18 14:17 UTC	7h 7m	FARWAH	LY	-	-
KARIM ALLAH	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-18 13:49 UTC	3d 5h 42m	RASA	HR	-	-
RUNAWAY BAY	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-18 09:45 UTC	6d 22h 33m	PUERTO BO...	EC	-	-
VOS TRITON	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-18 07:10 UTC	-	-	-	FARWAH	LY
ASSO TRENTA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-18 06:12 UTC	-	-	-	BOURI	LY
ANWAAR LIBYA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-17 15:17 UTC	10d 13h 25m	MISURATA	LY	-	-
ANWAAR LIBYA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-17 15:16 UTC	10d 13h 24m	-	-	-	-
ASSO TRENTA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-16 15:35 UTC	9h 10m	-	-	-	-
ASSO TRENTA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-16 06:25 UTC	-	-	-	BOURI	LY
NICOLA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-15 16:10 UTC	2d 5h 21m	BENGAZI	LY	-	-
VENTO DI SCIROC...	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-15 14:30 UTC	-	-	-	MARSAXLOKK	MT
KARIM ALLAH	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-15 08:07 UTC	-	-	-	RASA	HR
ASSO VENTQUATT...	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-14 15:55 UTC	1d 9h 13m	ZARZIS	TN	-	-
VOS TRITON	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-01-14 14:38 UTC	7h 43m	FARWAH	LY	-	-

Ships docked at Tripoli Port circa January 17th 2020. Source MarineTraffic

Two ships attract our attention: Karim Allah, a livestock transporter type and Vento Di Scirocco, a container transporter type. These are two prime candidates because of their size, foreign origin and brief stay in Tripoli Port. But a quick search online does not highlight any notable results, such as links with Turkey or a stop-over at a Turkish port. They do not exhibit unusual behaviour, and their transponders have remained turned on and do not show travel through Turkish waters. But on January 16th, 2020 posts emerged on social networks from Libyan accounts mentioning a new boat which does not appear on the MarineTraffic list: MV Single Eagle.



An example from a Facebook account alerting on the arrival of MV Single Eagle - https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=117501896439693&id=103326034523946

1.4. MV Single Eagle by turning off its GPS system becomes a ghost ship in Libya

MV Single Eagle (IMO: 8708830) is a vehicle-carrier type of vessel under a Panama flag. In the Equasis database, Dytamar Shipping Ltd is listed as MV Single Eagle's owner. The ship is managed by Rana Maritime Services SA and operated by African Mediterranean Lines.



© Yuichi MORITA
MarineTraffic.com

IMO number	Role	Name of company	Address	Date of effect
6143077	Ship manager/Commercial manager	AFRICAN MEDITERRANEAN LINES	Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.	since 01/04/2016
5502842	ISM Manager	RANA MARITIME SERVICES SA	2nd Floor, Albahaa Building, Old Sea Road, Khaldeh, Lebanon.	since 30/10/2014
5741733	Registered owner	DYTAMAR SHIPPING LTD	Care of African Mediterranean Lines SAL , Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.	during 06/2013

Source : Equasis

Looking closely at its route around January 17th, we can see it is leaving Mersin in Turkey, supposedly destined for Hamburg in Germany.


SINGLE EAGLE	ARRIVAL	Port	HAMBURG	DE	2020-01-26 16:05 UTC	-	-	-
SINGLE EAGLE	DEPARTURE	Port	MERSIN	TR	2020-01-12 07:24 UTC	19h 47m	HAMBURG	DE

By carefully looking at the boat's AIS data transmitted by its transponder (indicating its GPS location on a regular basis), we realize the transponder was turned off on the morning of January 15th and switched back on the afternoon of January 17th. The vessel could not be tracked for more than 48 hours.

2020-01-17 16:23 UTC	Sat-AIS	15.1 knots	273 degrees	37.68756	8.802767
2020-01-15 07:47 UTC	Sat-AIS	12.5 knots	177 degrees	33.77727	13.23478


source: MarineTraffic

Based on its last registered AIS data on 01/15 we can locate the boat off the Libyan coast near Tripoli, heading in the direction of the port.



Last position sent by Single Eagle on 01/15

When the team switches back the transponder they are already sailing alongside Tunisian waters in the direction of Europe.



Therefore, we could deduce the delivery took place on January 16th.


2. MV Single Eagle is used for a car shipping business from Germany to Lebanon and belongs to a German affiliate of a Lebanese company

Looking closely on social networks, Single Eagle appears to frequently transport vehicles from Europe to Libya.




Facebook account of [First United Company](#)

As mentioned earlier, Single Eagle is commercially operated by African Mediterranean Lines, based at the following address: Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon. Looking closer at the address displayed in Equasis, we find that « *Orient Queen Homes* » is actually a hotel and the company is located on the ground floor.



On the map, another company is located at the same place: *Abou Merhi Cruises* which organizes cruises on the Orient Queen boat according to its website⁴⁰.



source : Orient Queen website

Abou Merhi Cruises is linked to a holding called Abou Merhi, headed by Merhi Ali Abou Merhi.

About Merhi Cruises Sal - AMC (Abou Merhi Lines)

SUGGEST EDIT

General Info

Company ID#: 52032
 Company Name: Abou Merhi Cruises Sal - AMC (Abou Merhi Lines)
 Original Name: Abou Merhi Cruises Sal - AMC (Abou Merhi Lines)
 Company Establishment: 2005
 Number of Staff: 22
 Registration Number: 1004104 (Beirut)

Activities

SHIP OWNERS, TOURISTIC DESTINATIONS, TOURIST AGENCY SERVICES

Specifications

Cruising, excursions, reservations, management of cruises, the first upsail cruise that embarks & disembarks from Beirut

Additional Info

Legal Advisor
 Me. Samer Mohamad Aouni Haddad

Audit
 Audit Firm (Doumani & Co.)

Specifications
 Cruising, excursions, reservations, management of cruises, the first upsail cruise that embarks & disembarks from Beirut

Highlights

Capital: LBP 100,000,000.00
 Assets: N/A
 Advertising Budget: N/A

Executives

Owner(s)

Mr. Merhi Ali Abou Merhi

Chief Executive Officer

Mr. Merhi Ali Abou Merhi

Manager(s)

Mrs. Hana Merhi Abou Merhi

Contact Details

Beirut Central District
 Floor: 3, Atrium Building, Weygand Street, BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT, Beirut, LEBANON

Website: <http://www.amcruises.com>
 Email(s): info@aboumerhigroup.com | info@amcruises.com
 P.O.Box: 17-5016 BEIRUT
 Phone: +961 01 - 999611 | +961 01 - 999613 | +961 01 - 999614 | +961 01 - 999615 | +961 01 - 999616 | +961 01 - 999617 | +961 01 - 999618 | +961 01 - 999619
 Mobile: +961 03 - 999612 | +961 03 - 999611 (Company)
 Fax: +961 01 - 999612

Saida
 Jezzine Street, SAIDA, Saida, LEBANON
 Phone: +961 07 - 755570 | +961 07 - 755560

Group

Services, Wholesale, Agent

Companies Working With (Banks, Auditing,...)

Abou Merhi Lines Sal (Offshore) (Sister Company)
 Abou Merhi Group Sal (Sister Company)
 Ibi Bank S.A.L. (Bank)

Legal Advisers

Me. Samer Mohamad Aouni Haddad

Audit Firms

Doumani & Co.

source : Sindex

⁴⁰ <https://www.orientqueen.com/>

Abou Merhi Lines SAL Offshore seems to be an offshore vehicle in Lebanon.

Abou Merhi Lines Sal (Offshore)

 SUGGEST EDIT

General Info

Company ID#: 47284
 Company Name: Abou Merhi Lines Sal (Offshore)
 Original Name: Abou Merhi Lines Sal (Offshore)
 Company Establishment: 2002
 Number of Staff: 0
 Registration Number: 1255 (Beirut)

Activities

SHIP OWNERS, Offshore Firms

Specifications

Charters of car carriers & reefership for car transport

Additional Info

Specifications
 Charters of car carriers & reefership for car transport

Highlights

Capital: LBP 2,100,000.00
 Assets: N/A
 Advertising Budget: N/A

Executives

Board of Directors

Mr. Merhi Ali Abou Merhi

Chief Executive Officer

Mr. Merhi Ali Abou Merhi

Manager(s)

Mrs. Zareen Fodda (Assistant General Manager)

Contact Details

 **Beirut Central District**
 Floor: 3, Atrium Building, Weygand Street, BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT, Beirut, LEBANON

Website: <http://www.aboumerhillines.com>

Website: <http://www.amcruises.com>

Email(s): info@aboumerhillines.com | info@aboumerhigroup.com

P.O.Box: 17-5016 BEIRUT

Phone: +961 01 - 999611 | +961 01 - 999613 | +961 01 - 999614 | +961 01 - 999615 | +961 01 - 999616 | +961 01 - 999617 | +961 01 - 999618 | +961 01 - 999619

Fax: +961 01 - 999612

Group

Commerce, Services

Companies Working With (Banks, Auditing,...)


Abou Merhi Cruises Sal - AMC (Abou Merhi Lines) (Sister Company)

Abou Merhi Group Sal (Sister Company)

Ibl Bank S.A.L (Bank)

Source: 5index.com

The ship's trips are advertised online by Ali Abou Merhi, a manager from the company AML Ship Management gmbh, established in Hamburg in Germany. The advertisements are branded African Mediterranean Lines. In a Facebook post published on January 15th, it is announced that the vessel will go to Misrata and Benghazi, with an expected time of arrival to Germany on January 27th. This post gives us additional confidence that the vessel was at Tripoli Port around January 16th.



Facebook account of Abou Ali Merhi⁴¹

AML Ship Management gmbh seems to be the local entity behind African Mediterranean Lines with identified directors Abou Ali Merhi (identified on Facebook) and Josef Nasr. They replaced Wajdi Nasr and Abdel Bassal.

⁴¹ <https://www.facebook.com/ali.a.merhi>

opencorporates

The Open Database Of The Corporate World

Company name or num

Companies Officers

AML Ship Management GmbH

Company Number K1101R_HRB118179

Native Company Number Hamburg HRB 118179

Status Currently Registered

Jurisdiction Germany

Registered Address Zippelhaus 4, 20457 Hamburg.
Germany


Directors / Officers Ali Abou Merhi, geschäftsführer, 22 Dec 2016-
Birger Runge, geschäftsführer, 12 May 2011-
Josef Nasr, geschäftsführer, 26 Feb 2019-

Inactive Directors / Officers Adel Bassal, geschäftsführer, 19 Oct 2015-22 Dec 2016
Wajdi Nasr, geschäftsführer, 3 May 2011-19 Oct 2015

Source Gemeinsames Registerportal der Länder, <https://www.handelsregister.de/>, 28 Apr 2019

Source:OpenCorporate


Since its creation in 2011, AML Ship Management has several changes in office location and directors.



Source: northdata.de

We get a better view of the links between directors and corporate entities with this chart publicly available from northdata.de with a company – Abou Merhi Linieagentur GmbH now dissolved –

linked to a former director of AML Ship Management – Wajdi Youssef Nasr who was put under sanctions by OFAC as an affiliate of Abou Merhi Group before getting cleared (see next chapter). A current director, Joseph Nasr, is linked also to a newly created company.



Source: northdata.de

“African Mediterranean Lines”, which appears on the Facebook post, seems to be a legal entity as we can also find a mention of it on google as an offshore corporate entity identified with Abou Merhi Group in Lebanon.



Infospectrum have assessed this company

This is a preview of the report:

African Mediterranean Lines AML SAL Offshore

Registered address: Fakhreddine Street, Alayli Building, 8th floor, Saida, Beirut, Lebanon

Sector: Ship Owner

Country: Lebanon

African Mediterranean Lines SAL (hereafter referred to as AML) is a private limited company that was registered in Lebanon in 2003. The company is owned by Lebanese national Atef Ali Abou-Merhi and his two sisters, who are the children of well-known Lebanese business ma...

Infospectrum's standard reports are designed to meet key requirements of counterparty and credit due diligence, and include information and analysis covering:

- Ownership structure and beneficial control
- History
- Quality of management and operations
- Financial strength
- References from counterparties
- Sanctions
- Assessment, Scores/Ratings

Infospectrum conducts new assessments upon request, and also offers bespoke research and investigations services, with a focus on the shipping, energy and commodities trading sectors.



Source: Infospectrum⁴²

42 <http://portal.infospectrum.net/searchorder/GoogleCompanySearch.aspx?CompanyId=108579>
76

We can find a website with Jade Car Logistics logo which allows you to book shipping transportation. They advertise SINGLE EAGLE vessel.



[<<< home](#)

Ship schedule

Vessel	Voyage		Ports					
	No.		Wilhelmshaven	Antwerp	Tripoli	Sour	Misurata	Benghazi
MV "SINGLE EAGLE" max 30 tons, 4.0m height	33	ETA	27.01.2020	29.01.2020	---	---	11.02.2020	---
		ETS	---	---	---	---	---	---
MV "Gran Canaria Car" max 38 tons, 5.0m height	34	ETA	09.04.2020	11.04.2020	---	---	20.04.2020	---
		ETS	---	---	---	---	---	---
MV "SINGLE EAGLE" max 30 tons, 4.0m height	35	ETA	20.05.2020	22.05.2020	05.06.2020	04.06.2020	31.05.2020	---
		ETS	---	---	---	---	---	---

source: car-booking.online

Looking up the domain name, it appears to be registered by AML Ship Management GmbH.

Whois Record for Car-Booking.online

— Domain Profile

Registrant Org	AML Ship Management GmbH
Registrant Country	de
Registrar	1&1 IONOS SE IANA ID: 83 URL: http://1und1.de Whois Server: whois.1und1.de abuse@1and1.com
Registrar Status	clientTransferProhibited
Dates	1,587 days old Created on 2016-02-26 Expires on 2021-02-26 Updated on 2020-05-01
Name Servers	NS-DE.1AND1-DNS.BIZ (has 63,010 domains) NS-DE.1AND1-DNS.COM (has 21,269 domains) NS-DE.1AND1-DNS.DE (has 75,777 domains) NS-DE.1AND1-DNS.ORG (has 9,716 domains)
Tech Contact	—
IP Address	93.90.193.23 is hosted on a dedicated server
IP Location	- Baden-wuerttemberg - Karlsruhe - Fasthosts Internet Limited
ASN	AS8560 ONEANDONE-AS Brauerstrasse 48, DE (registered Nov 26, 1997)
Hosting History	1 change on 2 unique name servers over 4 years

source: whois domain tools

We are not able using open-sources to link Rana Maritime, the owner of the boat, to this Lebanese group. But with the elements we have, we can hypothesise that MV Single Eagle could be operated through a leasing agreement between Rana Maritime and Abou Merhi group. This type of financial

structure is quite common in the shipping sector. Yet, some questions remain. In the next chapter we will add more details on Abou Merhi Group, which owns another ship – MV BANA - that has been suspected of transporting arms to Libya.

Case study: MV BANA

At the end of January 2020, a video circulated on Twitter showing Turkish military equipment destined for Libya that was allegedly delivered on January 28th, 2020.



ΙΣΟΖΥΓΙΟ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΣΧΥΟΣ
@isozygio

Ιανουαρίου 2020 μεταφέροντας
Τεθωρακισμένα Οχήματα Μεταφοράς
Προσωπικού ACV-AAPC, A/K πυροβόλα T155
Firtina, ΠΕΠ T122 και P/K A/A πυροβόλα
GDF-003 του Τουρκικού Στρατού, βαμμένα σε
παραλλαγή ερήμου.



♡ 25 11:00 - 31 janv. 2020



💬 16 personnes parlent à ce sujet



source: <https://twitter.com/isozygio/status/1223184321827213313>

On February 5th, 2020, the Italian authorities in Genoa⁴³ seized and searched BANA vessel while it was calling there on its return from Libya, arriving on February 2nd. This event seems to corroborate the facts reported in January 2020. Based on this evidence, using only open-sources we brought to light:

⁴³ <https://www.genova24.it/2020/02/traffico-darmi-tra-turchia-e-libia-perquisizione-a-bordo-della-bana-sequestrati-documenti-mappe-e-la-scatola-nera-230495/>

- Violation of the embargo by Turkey with a new arms shipment.
- Possible dissemination of the material to the pro-GNA factions.
- Presence of a boat from Turkey at Tripoli port.
- The use of a carrier of Lebanese nationality on several occasions.
- A possible link between the current owner of the boat and a Lebanese entity sanctioned for two years from 2015 to 2017 by the United States Treasury for its logistical support to a drug trafficker affiliated with Hezbollah.

1. MV BANA, a commercial Lebanese vessel, escorted by military Turkish frigates to deliver Turkish military equipment to Libya

1.1. MV BANA with its GPS system off can be tracked on its way to Libya by satellite images and photos

Based on MarineTraffic data, BANA is a regularly sailing to Libya. Yet on January 28th no data mentions its arrival to Tripoli.

BANA	ARRIVAL	Port	GENOVA	IT	2020-02-02 11:50 UTC
BANA	DEPARTURE	Port	BEIRUT	LB	2020-01-21 18:30 UTC


BANA en route to Italy.

Two options can explain the data: either BANA never went to Tripoli on these dates, either BANA's crew has switched off its AIS transponder, a sort of transmitter/receiver that gives the boat's GPS position on a regular basis.

In this case Twitter can be a solid starting base to compare and compile the work others have done. This ship of interest was indeed already spotted by some ship spotters.



As we can trace back the boat's journey using its AIS data released occasionally, it is possible to make them match with some satellite images showing Turkish military frigates escorting the boat.



source: <https://twitter.com/PutinIsAVirus/status/1223233891382763520>



On the occasion of the Berlin Conference French President Macron⁴⁴ mentions Turkish frigates escorting ships. It is interesting to note the ship turned off its AIS transponder while reaching Turkish shores with a day gap between January 22nd and 24th.

2020-01-24 06:37 UTC	Terr-AIS	10.1 knots	184 degrees	36.74435	34.65051
2020-01-22 15:26 UTC	Terr-AIS	9.7 knots	0 degrees	36.60019	34.66305

Source: MarineTraffic

The ship seems to have made it to Mersin before heading to Libya. A photo found on social media published on January 23rd is geolocated at Mersin Port, confirming the direction the ship took on January 22nd.

44 <http://www.opex360.com/2020/01/30/deux-fregates-turques-croisent-au-large-de-tripoli/>
81



Source: MarineTraffic on January 22nd and 24th



In the background: M/V Bana on January 23, before her departure to Libya (blue and white, in the middle) and a warship (grey, on the left)
Source: Instagram, January 23, 2020

Similar photos appear on social networks around January 28/29 with military frigates identified as G-class. While it is not possible to date the photos, they seem to corroborate @PutinisVirus's work matching satellite images with AIS data.




MV BANA escorted by a frigate



 **Jake Longworth** @MaritimeSecuri1 · 29 janv. 2020 
En réponse à @MaritimeSecuri1
[twitter.com/lna2019m/statu...](https://twitter.com/lna2019m/status/1222309812727418892) [twitter.com/LNA2019M/statu...](https://twitter.com/LNA2019M/status/1222309812727418892)

Unconfirmed, but dumping follow-up here ref. reports they may have berthed. If they had berthed though, I'd be expecting a lot of pictures:[twitter.com/farajaljarah/s...](https://twitter.com/farajaljarah/status/1222309812727418892)
[twitter.com/FarajAljarah/s...](https://twitter.com/FarajAljarah/status/1222309812727418892)

Faraj Aljarah 🇲🇵🇵🇸 @FarajAljarah
Two Turkish frigates with at least one helicopter enter the port of #Tripoli and reportedly unload weapons and military equipment, according to witnesses. #Libya



♥️ 2 01:05 - 29 janv. 2020 

 [Voir les autres Tweets de Jake Longworth](#) 

source : <https://twitter.com/MaritimeSecuri1/status/1222309812727418892>

On January 28th a boat with the same colour scheme and a significant size is docked at Tripoli Port according to satellite images from Sentinel Hub Explorer. This could be BANA.



BANA vessel at the centre of this screen shot next to the unique blue warehouse on the right (image from Sentinel Hub).

1.2. Heavy equipment delivered in Tripoli ?

The video mentioned at the start of this article shows tanks, armoured vehicles and heavy artillery.



Screen shots from the initial video

We can identify some of the equipment, mainly from Turkish manufacturers. This artillery equipment fitted on wheels seems to be a Oerlikon 35 mm Twin Barrel Anti-Aircraft Gun which is manufactured under licence by MKEK⁴⁵. It is a towed anti-aircraft gun.

⁴⁵ <https://www.mkek.gov.tr/en/product.aspx?id=52&source=Products&pid=1454>



Source: original video and BBC documentary Turkey's Ghost Ship⁴⁶



Reference photo

On this screenshot we can see in the foreground Korkut air defence system by ASELEAN and tanks, which could be the T-155 Firtina (front, canon insertion, wheels) is a 155mm 52 calibre self-propelled howitzer manufactured in Turkey by a consortium of Turkish Defence Companies.

⁴⁶ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yW8f9ptdY_o
85



Source: BBC documentary Turkey's Ghost Ship



Reference image for Korkut



Image reference for T-155 Firtina

The last equipment which we can identify seems to be a ACV-15. The ACV-15 is a light combat tracked armoured vehicle developed, designed and manufactured by the Turkish Company FNSS Savunma Sistemleri.




Source: BBC documentary Turkey's Ghost Ship



Reference image for the ACV-15

A reverse image search of these screen shots can let us know the video has not been published before its release end of January. However, it is not possible at this stage to confirm this shipment was on BANA even though the date and mentions in Italian media seem to be relevant indications.

Finally a testimony from a crew member interrogated by the Italian police in Genoa confirms some of the equipment on the boat with the addition of Mercedes jeeps used with anti-tank guns mounted on them⁴⁷.



Source: BBC documentary Turkey's Ghost Ship

2. A ship already known from the Turks and Libyans...

This late January journey to Libya was not the first one for BANA (imo: 7920857)⁴⁸.



source : MarineTraffic

47 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yW8f9ptdY_o On the topic of German origin weapons in Libya: <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/report-muenchen/waffenembargo-libyen-101.html>

48 <https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:413810/mmsi:450568000/imo:7920857/vessel:BANA>


2.1. A ghost journey in November 2019 with a turned off AIS system

Having a closer look at BANA's AIS data over the past months reveals the ship turned off its transponder in November 2019 at large of the Libyan coast for more than 36 hours from November 15th to 19th.


<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-19 17:42 UTC	Sat-AIS	8.8 knots	329 degrees	33.28856	14.83596	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-15 23:19 UTC	Sat-AIS	9.7 knots	244 degrees	34.91901	19.95498	

Source:Marine Traffic


Looking at its journey, it starts at the port of Istanbul which the ship departs on November 11th.



On the 14th, the ship enters the Mediterranean waters.



On the 15th at 23h18 the ship switches off its AIS transponder at about 286.3 nautical miles from Misrata at a speed of about nine knots.



The ship turns back on its transponder on the 19th at the end of the afternoon 55 nautical miles away from the Libyan coasts. Assuming the destination was Misrata Port, the vessel would have arrived on the 17th in the early morning at around 04h00 and would have departed on the 19th in the morning at around 11am.



There is no trace of MV BANA at Misrata Port during these dates. The only vessel coming from Turkey to Misrata is MV KOSOVAK.

KOSOVAK	271047045	ARRIVAL	Port	MISURATA	LY	2019-11-17 09:09 UTC	-	-	-	AMBARLI
---------	-----------	---------	------	----------	----	----------------------	---	---	---	---------

Coincidentally the LNA spokesperson released a statement on November 18th following targeted strikes on Misrata due to the delivery by ship of 18 armoured vehicles.

الناطق الرسمي باسم القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية
 18 novembre 2019

بيان القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية بشأن الغارات الجوية على أهداف بمدينة مصراتة بتاريخ 18/11/2019

في إطار العمليات العسكرية الشاملة ضد التنظيمات الإرهابية التي انتهكت سيادة الدولة وهددت أمنها وسلامة أراضيها ودمرت اقتصادها وبددت مواردها ، وبناء على المعلومات الاستخباراتية الدقيقة تم رصد ومتابعة عملية نقل عدد (19مدرعة) بواسطة السفينة المدنية التركية (كوسافاك رست) من تركيا إلى ميناء الحديد والصلب بمنطقة مصراتة يوم الاثنين الموافق 18/11/2019 والتي تم نقلها لاحقاً من ميناء وتخزينها في منطقة صناعية في وسط المدينة بهدف استخدامها في أرض العمليات وفق خططهم المعروفة لأجهزتنا الاستخباراتية ، وهو ما يشكل حرق جديد من قبل تركيا لقرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي والتي تنص على فرض حظر الأسلحة. وبعد اكتمال المعلومات الاستخباراتية من خلال التتبع والمراقبة لهذه الشحنة العسكرية منذ بداية تنزيل المدرعات من السفينة حتى وصولها إلى المخازن ، قام سلاح الجو الليبي وبعد التخطيط لاستهداف هذه المدرعات في نفس يوم وصولها وقبل خروجها من مخازنها لمنع استخدامها في أعمال عدوانية تهدد أمن وسلامة البلاد والعباد والجيش الوطني العربي الليبي ، تم بحمد اهلهم تنفيذ طلعات جوية مخطط لها بواسطة طائرات سلاح الجو الليبي كانت نتيجتها إصابة أهدافها وتدمير المدرعات بدقة عالية وقد نتج عن هذا الاستهداف انفجارات هائلة متتالية نتيجة تخزين أسلحة وذخائر وصواريخ فيها ، إضافة للمدرعات ، وقد عادت طائراتنا لقواعدها سالمه.

وتحذر القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية من استمرار الدعم العسكري التركي للمليشيات الإرهابية ، وكما تطالب بإبعاد مدينة مصراتة من استخدامها في المجهود العسكري حفاظاً على سلامة سكانها ومراقبتها ، كما وتنبه إن استخدام السفن والطائرات المدنية في نقل معدات عسكرية وتخزين هذه المعدات العسكرية في مرافق مدنية يعتبر انتهاك للقانون الدولي والدولي الإنساني والأعراف الدولية .

وتطمئن شعبنا الأبي أن قواته المسلحة والمتمثلة في أجهزة الاستخبارات وسلاح الجو وكافة وحداتها قادرة على رصد ومرافقة أي إمدادات للمليشيات الإرهابية وتدميرها فور وصولها إلى كافة المؤن والمطارات دون تأخير أو إهمال.

انتهى البيان
 القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة العربية الليبية
 صدر بتاريخ 18/11/2019



Source; facebook.com/spoxlna

The release mentions MV KOSOVAK as the Turkish ship transporting the vehicles. While there are no images to prove it, the likely presence of MV BANA at the same time at Misrata Port with a turned off transponder appears to be very suspicious. In addition, MV KOSOVAC leaves Misrata on the 19th for Khoms before heading back to Turkey, which is bold for a boat suspected of illegally transporting military equipment.

2.2. Deliveries under its old name – Sham 1

When looking at matching the vessel's IMO to old names we realize that the old name Sham 1 is already known in Libya for its military deliveries

Name of ship	Date of effect
BANA	since 01/10/2019
Sham 1	since 01/02/2016
City Of Misurata	since 01/04/2013

source Equasis

According to a UN Security Council report⁴⁹, the ship has been identified as a transporter of military equipment in January and April 2017. It is interesting to note that the vessel was used to deliver military vehicles in January 2017 to Tobruk to General Haftar forces, which Turkey does not support.

Annex 41 Vehicles Delivered to Tobruk for LNA Affiliated Armed Groups

1. The Panel received from several sources information on a delivery of over 300 Toyota pickups and armoured Landcruisers to Tobruk on 16 January 2017. A verification of maritime data showed that the only vessel appropriate to carrying vehicles and docked in Tobruk is the **SHAM 1**.
2. The SHAM 1 (IMO 7920857) is a vehicle carrier. It called at Tobruk port on 16 Jan 2017, mooring for 36 hours.

7920857	Tobruk	Libya	15-Jan-17 07:11	2017- 01-16	SHAM 1	VEHICLES CARRIER	Med Wave Shipping SA
7920857	Tobruk	Libya	19-Dec-16 19:51	2016- 12-21	SHAM 1	VEHICLES CARRIER	Med Wave Shipping SA
7920857	Tobruk	Libya	07-Nov-16 10:05	2016- 11-07	SHAM 1	VEHICLES CARRIER	Med Wave Shipping SA
7920857	Tobruk	Libya	23-Oct-15 22:44	2015- 10-23	SHAM 1	VEHICLES CARRIER	Med Wave Shipping SA

Source: IHS Seaweb

<https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5b641bfd4>

3. MV BANA is linked to Abou Merhi Group, a former sanctioned entity for its logistics support to some Hezbollah operations

According to MarineTraffic BANA belongs to a company called Med Wave Shipping S.A.

Général

IMO: **7920857**
 Nom: **BANA**
 Vessel Type - Generic: **Cargo**
 Vessel Type - Detailed: **Vehicles Carrier**
 État: **Active**
 MMSI: **450568000**
 Indicatif d'Appel: **ODWM**
 Pavillon: **Lebanon [LB]**
 Jauge brute: **9367 t**
 Summer DWT: **4401 t**
 Longueur Hors Tout x Largeur Hors Tout: **128.31 x 20 m**
 Année de Construction: **1980**
 Port d'origine: **BEIRUT**
 Classification Society: -
 Constructeur: **USUKI SHIPBUILDING - USUKI, JP**
 Propriétaire: **MED WAVE SHIPPING**
 Directeur: **MED WAVE SHIPPING**

⁴⁹ <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=fr/S/2017/466>

According to world-ships⁵⁰ which gives the addresses of shipping companies, we find again our target company located in Jordan, but we are unable to identify who is in control or if the company is still active.

MED WAVE SHIPPING SA, Amman, Jordan



Company Name	MED WAVE SHIPPING SA
Company Name Full	MED WAVE SHIPPING SA
Activity	Owner, Manager
Address	Office 511, 5th Floor, Baraka Building, Dauwar al-Waha, Amman, Jordan
Town	Amman
Country	Jordan

source: <https://world-ships.com/company/66dfa48e8744828694bf140b63a01650>

With the Lebanese flag as a hint, a second look on Equasis database gives us a new address in Lebanon.

IMO number	Role	Name of company	Address	Date of effect
5898445	Registered owner	MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Ground Floor, Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.	since 25/09/2019
5990679	ISM Manager	MIDDLE EAST MARITIME CONSULT	2nd Floor, Al-Bahaa Building, Old Saïda Road, Choueifat, Lebanon.	since 25/09/2019
5898445	Ship manager/Commercial manager	MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Ground Floor, Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.	before 02/2016

Med Wave Shipping company is registered on a paywalled database dedicated to Lebanese corporates (2\$ per report). Med Wave Shipping's principal activity is the acquisition of ships with the specific mention of Sham 1, BANA's old name. The company seems to be a special purpose vehicle set up to buy the boat. No information is available on the company's directors and managers, or on the local law firm that structured the transaction. This entity is likely to be part of a larger corporate network whose ultimate beneficiary cannot be identified at this stage using open-source information.

⁵⁰ <https://world-ships.com/>

Med Wave Shipping Snc - Al Cheikh And Co

General Info

Company ID#: 1032625
 Company Name: Med Wave Shipping Snc - Al Cheikh And Co
 Original Name: Med Wave Shipping Snc - Al Cheikh And Co
 Company Establishment: 2016
 Number of Staff: 0
 Registration Number: 1020728 (Beirut)

Specifications

Acquisition of boats - (Sham 1)

Additional Info

Legal Advisor
 Nabil Adnan Oueidat

Audit
 Audit Firm


Specifications
 Freight
 Acquisition of boats - (Sham 1)

Personal Info

Source: 5index.com

3.1. A history under sanctions for logistic support to an Hezbollah affiliated group

Looking closer at the address displayed in Equasis (*Ground Floor, Orient Queen Homes Building, John Kennedy Street, Ras Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon*), it is the same address as in the SINGLE EAGLE chapter for African Mediterranean Lines, which we established is linked to Abou Merhi holding.



By looking at BANA ownership history we can see that Abou Merhi Ship Management SAL and AML Ship Management GmbH were the former commercial manager and safety standard manager, based in Lebanon and Germany respectively. AML Ship Management GmbH is also managing the Single Eagle vessel.

MIDDLE EAST MARITIME CONSULT	ISM Manager	since 25/09/2019
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Registered owner	since 25/09/2019
MIDDLE EAST MARITIME CONSULT	Registered owner	during 06/2019
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Registered owner	before 02/2016
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Ship manager/Commercial manager	before 02/2016
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	ISM Manager	since 01/12/2015
AML SHIP MANAGEMENT GMBH	ISM Manager	since 01/10/2012
AML SHIP MANAGEMENT GMBH	ISM Manager	since 06/09/2012
AML SHIP MANAGEMENT GMBH	ISM Manager	since 07/03/2012
ABOU MERHI SHIP MANAGEMENT SAL	ISM Manager	since 06/02/2009
ABOU MERHI SHIP MANAGEMENT SAL	Ship manager/Commercial manager	since 01/08/2008

Source : Equasis

A quick look on search engines shows the two companies belong to Abou Merhi Group. This holding with investments in maritime shipping, tourism, real estate is managed by Merhi Ali Abou Merhi, a Lebanese businessman.

In October 2015, Merhi Ali Abou Merhi and some of his collaborators and companies are listed on the OFAC⁵¹ sanction list for links with the Joumaa network, affiliated with Hezbollah, for its role in drug trafficking and money laundering.

⁵¹ <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0196.aspx>

October 2015

Abou Merhi Vessels

Abou Merhi Lines
Member of Abou Merhi Group

Abou-Merhi Lines SAL
Atrium Building, Weygand Street
Central District, NejmeH Sector,
Beirut, Lebanon
Atrium Building, Mosquee
El-Omari Street, NejmeH Area
Marfaa Sector, Beirut, Lebanon



City of Antwerp
Registration 8709133
MMSI 356459000
Call Sign: 3FRY8
Flag: Panama

City of Lutece
Registration 8017970
MMSI 248781000
Call Sign: 9HRJ6
Flag: Malta

City of Misurata
Registration 7920857
MMSI 354134000
Call Sign: 3EMY5
Flag: Panama

City of Tokyo
Registration 8709145
MMSI 636016488
Call Sign: D5GK6
Flag: Liberia

Orient Queen II
Registration 8701193
MMSI 373703000
Call Sign: 3FDJ9
Flag: Panama



JOMAA Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Organization
Designated on January 26, 2011



Merhi Ali Abou MERHI
DOB 05 Jul 1964
POB Hilalie, Lebanon

U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act



Hassan Mahmoud AYASH
DOB: 1 May 1963
Beirut, Lebanon
Designated on January 26, 2011

MERHI Business Associates



Houeda Ahmad NASREDDINE
DOB 14 Aug 1965
POB Kfarhatla, Lebanon



Hana Merhi Abou MERHI
DOB 31 Mar 1987
POB Germany



Atef Merhi Abou MERHI
DOB 06 Aug 1989
POB Saïda, Lebanon



Ahmad EL BEZRI
DOB 09 Feb 1989
POB Saïda, Lebanon



Wajdi Youssef NASR
DOB 25 Sep 1974
POB Lebanon

Abou Merhi Group Companies

Abou Merhi Group
Weygand Str., Atrium Bldg.
Beirut Central District
Beirut, Lebanon

Abou Merhi COTONO
Commune De Semepkodji Quartier Djeffa 01B7885
Cotonou, Benin

Abou Merhi NIGERIA
Abou Merhi Nigeria
Grimaldi Port Complex Tin Can Island Port
Lagos, Nigeria

Abou Merhi HAMBURG
Abou Merhi Hamburg
Borstelmannsweg 145 D, 20537
Hamburg, Germany
Hermann-Blohm-Strasse 3, 20457
Hamburg, Germany

Queen Stations
Merhi Abou-Merhi Street
Saïda, Lebanon

Orient Queen Homes
John Kennedy Street 56526
Beirut, Lebanon

Lebanon Center
176 Wasfi Tall Street, (The Gardens)
Amman, Jordan

Le MALL SAIDA
Saïda, Saïda, Al Janub, Lebanon

Abou Merhi Cruises (AMC) SAL
The Atrium Building, Weygand Street
Beirut Central District Area, NejmeH Sector
Beirut, Lebanon

Abou Merhi Charity Institution
Merhi Abou Merhi Street, Hilaliye
Saïda, Lebanon

source: treasury.gov

« Orient Queen Homes », Abou Merhi Hambourg, and the old BANA owners – the transport maritime entities – as well as the boat under its old name « City of Misurata » were also under sanctions. The boat was transferred to the Med Wave Shipping entity in December 2015.

MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Registered owner	before 02/2016
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	Ship manager/Commercial manager	before 02/2016
MED WAVE SHIPPING SA	ISM Manager	since 01/12/2015

source:Equasis

The vessel becomes SHAM I in February 2016. Have they changed the ship's name and transferred its property title in a new legal entity to circumvent commercial sanctions? This is one hypothesis but this lead from Equasis is not enough to demonstrate it and it is not possible to go further using open-sources at this stage.

Name of ship	Date of effect
BANA	since 01/10/2019
Sham 1	since 01/02/2016
City Of Misurata	since 01/04/2013

source: Equasis

However, on January 31st in an interview for Lebanese TV⁵², Abou Merhi CEO recognized he is the owner of BANA vessel.



لماذا جرى تغيير اسم الباخرة من شام ون الى بانا


كان اسم الباخرة مصراة، أنا بعثها لجماعة سوريين، اشتروها واسموها شام ون، وأنا عندما كان لدي مشاكل مع الأمريكان وطلعت براءة، مثل أنا في هذا الوقت بعث الباخرة، وبعث عدة بواخر. عندما اتهمني الأمريكان ... على أوفاك وطلعت براءة مثل ما بتعرفوا كلكم. رجعت أخذت الباخرة بعدها وأنا سميتها بانا

At 1:35 minutes, the journalist asked Abou Merhi CEO why the name of the ship changed from SHAM I to BANA. He answered “*The name of the ship was Misurata, I sold it to a Syrian group, they bought it and called it SHAM I, and when I had problems with the Americans and got up innocence, as I at this time sold the ship, and sold several ships. When the Americans accused me ... of OFAC and innocence like that, you all know. I came back and took the ship after I named it BANA.*

We can therefore build an approximate organisational chart linking MV Single Eagle and MV BANA to Abou Merhi Group.

⁵² <https://www.lbcgroup.tv/watch/chapter/49066/120096/bou-Merhi-cruise-and-turkish-armored-vehicles/en>

Translation with the help of SIRAJ



Approximate organizational chart linking the two ships of interest to a web of entities. Each line represents a link and does not imply necessarily an ownership status.

Abou Merhi Group, its subsidiaries and listed individuals have been de-listed from OFAC⁵³ in 2017. Their possible involvement in transporting arms with MV Single Eagle and MV BANA appears to warrant further investigations and questions about Abou Merhi Group’s activities and their removal from sanction lists.

53 <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20170509.aspx>
99

Case study: MV ANA

On February 18th, 2020, a Twitter account broadcasting news from the Libyan National Army posted images of the port of Tripoli being bombed by General Haftar's forces targeting an arms shipment from Turkey.

From this starting point, open-source research can show:

- A possible violation of the embargo by Turkey, based on a number of indicators pointing to a possible aborted arms shipment.
- The presence of a boat from Turkey at Tripoli Port.
- The use of a non-Turkish transporter to better hide the origin of goods.
- Doubts about the origin of the crew...


1. An arms shipment transported by MV ANA at Tripoli Port was diverted to Misrata Port following a LNA attack

1.1. Video and images circulating online can be geolocated to Tripoli Port

Images relating to the bombing circulating online can be geolocated to Tripoli port thanks to unique places like the blue warehouses (in orange), express way curves, mosques (in light green), the sea front (light purple), and a port building (yellow).



A satellite picture of Tripoli Port published by the private satellite imagery company ISI Intelligence shows the affected boats and smoke in the port, confirming the attack, the date and the location.



1.2. An alleged upcoming arms delivery is announced on the LNA official communication as a justification for air strikes on the port

On social networks, it is possible to find a post on Facebook dated February 18th, 2020⁵⁴ from the communication organ of the Libyan National Army, announcing the arrival of an arms shipment from Turkey and justifying the bombing of Tripoli port.



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/Media.Center.2019/posts/632777927488905>


54 <http://archive.vn/daSFM>
101

1.3. Vessels docked at this time

The vessel from Turkey, which was in port during the attack, can be identified by looking at the arrivals at the port and their origins on MarineTraffic⁵⁵.

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TAIBA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-18 08:33 UTC	-	-	-	DJIBOUTI	DJ
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OOO LEOPARD	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-18 06:33 UTC	-	-	-	MARSAXLOKK	MT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	VOS TRITON	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-18 06:24 UTC	-	-	-	FARWAH	LY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ASSO VENTICINQUE	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-18 05:36 UTC	-	-	-	TRIPOLI	LY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TALIA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-17 13:17 UTC	-	-	-	CARTAGENA	ES
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BALABAN	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-17 09:23 UTC	-	-	-	MISURATA	LY
<input type="checkbox"/>	OOO LEOPARD	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 20:25 UTC	8h 22m	-	-	-	-
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GAZ VENTURE	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 19:23 UTC	1d 5h 6m	TRIPOLI	LY	-	-
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SUHA QUEEN II	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 17:00 UTC	4d 5h 18m	TARRAGONA	ES	-	-
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ASSO TRENTA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 16:50 UTC	10h 22m	BOURI	LY	-	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	MATILDE A	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 15:25 UTC	1d 6h 37m	GEMLIK	TR	-	-
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AYLA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 13:48 UTC	-	-	-	VARNA	BG
<input type="checkbox"/>	OOO LEOPARD	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 12:03 UTC	-	-	-	MARSAXLOKK	MT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	COLD STREAM	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 08:27 UTC	-	-	-	PUERTO BOLI...	EC
<input type="checkbox"/>	ASSO TRENTA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 06:28 UTC	-	-	-	BOURI	LY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ANA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 02:15 UTC	-	-	-	MERSIN	TR

The vessel of interest here is called ANA (IMO : 7369118)⁵⁶. It appears to have been repainted in the following pictures published online around the time of the attack:



A closer examination of the vessel’s journey to Libya shows the boat would have spent 20 days until March 6th at Tripoli port despite the strikes.

ANA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-03-06 17:17 UTC	20d 15h 2m	HAYDARPASA	TR
ANA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 02:15 UTC	-	-	-

Source: MarineTraffic

⁵⁵ <https://www.marinetraffic.com/>


⁵⁶ <https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:465816/mmsi:201100150/imo:7369118/vessel:ANA>

On official videos of Fayeze el-Sarraj's visit to the port⁵⁷ after the strikes, there is no footage showing MV ANA docked near the location that was hit.



Source: Ruptly

An image available on Sentinel Hub dated of February 22nd show no MV ANA docked in Tripoli Port.



Source; Snetinel Hub from February 22nd 2020

A look at AIS data reveals the boat turned off its transponder on February 18th in Tripoli Port and switched it back on March 8th approaching the Greek islands.

⁵⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRTfzi0Vqtk>

<input type="checkbox"/>	2020-03-08 19:28 UTC	Terr-AIS	9.8 knots	60 degrees	35.72641	22.50843
<input type="checkbox"/>	2020-02-18 22:15 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	170 degrees	32.9058	13.1857

Source: MarineTraffic

ANA can actually be spotted at Misrata Port on the 21st of February. The high quality satellite image enables us to see the ship is being unloaded.



Source: Maxar for Google Earth, on February 21st 2020.

We can distinguish the white and blue color of the hull and the characteristic red and blue tower. Vehicles are being offloaded from the ship and trucks with trailers are awaiting nearby. It leads us to believe that the delivery initially intended for Tripoli instead took place at Misrata Port.



Source: close-up on MV ANA - Maxar for Google Earth, on February 21st 2020.

On February 21st, social media accounts, including Al Samood's, post photos of trailer trucks transporting artillery equipment, alongside the text "new shipment arrived". Despite the relatively limited information, at this stage in the investigative process there is a number of leads that point to the existence of an arms shipment in violation of the embargo.

Source: Al Samood brigade Facebook account⁵⁸

1.4. Official Turkish declarations confirmed military presence tasked to supervise arms deliveries

In the days following the strike on Tripoli Port, Turkish President Erdogan confirmed⁵⁹ to media that two Turkish military officers had been killed in the attack. A few days later, their names were revealed by a Turkish deputy in the opposition party:

İYİ Parti Milletvekili Prof. Dr. @umitodag

♦ Türk Ordusu Türkiye'den 2000 km uzaklıkta Libya'da da bir Arap iç savaşına müdahil hale gelmiştir.

♦ MİT mensubu, Okan Altınay ve Sinan Caferler Libya'da şehit olmuşlardır.

♦ Libya'da verilen şehitler Türk kamuoyundan gizleniyor. pic.twitter.com/3OQ58DDVou

– TÜR KÜN V A R O L M A S A V A Ş I (@tr_ttmt) March 4, 2020

source: https://twitter.com/tr_ttmt/status/1235235014205464576?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

An article on RFI⁶⁰ states that these two officers were tasked with overseeing the arms delivery at Tripoli Port.

⁵⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/2383067438376999/photos/a.2383155261701550/3362817587068641/?type=3&theater>

⁵⁹ <http://www.rfi.fr/europe/20200225-polemique-turquie-autour-mort-deux-soldats-libye-erdogan>

⁶⁰ <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20200226-libye-turquie-officier-renseignements-okan-altinay>

2. Shega Line, the shipping company, from Albania to being chartered by Turkey to Libya

With the help of MarineTraffic, we can see that MV ANA left Albania on February 1st, 2020 to go to Mersin in Turkey for a four-day stopover at the port - from February 5th to 9th - before leaving again for Tripoli, arriving on February 15th.

ANA	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	CANAKKALE AN...	TR	2020-03-10 11:33 UTC	-	-	-
ANA	DEPARTURE	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-03-06 17:17 UTC	20d 15h 2m	HAYDARPASA	TR
ANA	ARRIVAL	Port	TRIPOLI	LY	2020-02-15 02:15 UTC	-	-	-
ANA	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	MERSIN ANCH	TR	2020-02-09 23:46 UTC	9h 49m	-	-
ANA	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	MERSIN ANCH	TR	2020-02-09 13:57 UTC	-	-	-
ANA	DEPARTURE	Port	MERSIN	TR	2020-02-09 12:45 UTC	4d 10h 58m	TRIPOLI	LY
ANA	ARRIVAL	Port	MERSIN	TR	2020-02-05 01:47 UTC	-	-	-
ANA	DEPARTURE	Port	DURRES	AL	2020-02-01 01:53 UTC	3d 11h 1m	MERSIN	TR

source: MarineTraffic

A closer look at the previous photos of the ship in Tripoli shows that it has been repainted: the ‘Shega Line’⁶¹ lettering has been removed and repainted in blue, and the Albanian flag has been completely repainted red to camouflage the ship’s origin. One can hypothesize that this is why the boat stayed docked in Turkey for several days, to allow the paint to dry while the containers were loaded.

When consulting Equasis⁶², it is nevertheless clear that the ANA is still registered as the property of the Albanian company Shega Trans SHA, which was founded in 2018 and specializes in logistical transport by road, air and sea, with the vessels ANA and OTTO.


IMO number	Role	Name of company	Address	Date of effect	Details
5303648	Ship manager/Commercial manager	SHEGA-GROUP SA	Rruge Tefta Tashko 10, Tirane, Albania.	since 29/11/2017	→
5738001	ISM Manager	SEASTAR SHIPPING NAVIGATION	Via Guglielmo Melisurgo 4, 80133 Naples NA, Italy.	since 29/11/2017	→
6018216	Registered owner	SHEGA TRANS SA	Care of Shega-Group SA , Rruge Tefta Tashko 10, Tirane, Albania.	since 29/11/2017	→

Managed by an Albanian self-made man, Shega is using a picture of MV ANA on its LinkedIn⁶³ page. Its maritime shipping service states that it offers shipping only between Ravenna and Durres and Ravenna and Shengjin.

61 http://www.shega-trans.com/fleet_en.html

62 <https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/public/HomePage>


63 <http://archive.fo/Wzfl7>



Source : LinkedIn

3. A change of crew and a new life in as MV PRAY

On February 3rd, 2020, a Georgian recruitment agency specializing in staffing maritime crews placed an advert on Facebook⁶⁴ seeking to recruit additional crew members of Azeri and Georgian nationality for the ANA ship. The advert states that the owner of the boat is Turkish.



A story in Albanian media appears to suggest that the Shega Trans crew left the boat in Mersin and was replaced by a Turkish crew at this time. But what follows for MV ANA on its return from Libya is more intriguing. The following chapter examines its new life, under the identity of MV PRAY.

64 <http://archive.vn/NsfQ8>

Case study: MV PRAY

Following the strikes on Tripoli Port on February 18th, 2020, targeting a shipment brought by MV ANA, the boat appeared to have delivered its cargo in Misrata Port on February 21st, as per freely available satellite imagery.


From this point, open-source research can show:

- MV ANA got repainted and changed identification to MV PRAY.
- The new identification has not been accompanied by an administrative notification and is likely to result from AIS spoofing.
- MV PRAY was intercepted by the French army off the Libyan coast on the grounds of it being an illegal arms shipment.
- The shipment was brought back to Turkey with containers visible in photos.
- The Turkish army has likely been involved in managing the failed delivery back in Turkey.

1. From MV ANA to MV PRAY: a fabricated new physical and digital identity


1.1. The aftermath of the delivery in Misrata: lingering in nearby ports

MV ANA ended up in Misrata Port on February 21st delivering its shipment as seen on Google Earth/Maxar imagery.



Source: close-up on MV ANA - Maxar for Google Earth, on February 21st 2020.


In BBC Turkish Ghost Ships documentary⁶⁵ MV ANA is believed to have left Misrata on February 24^h. However, the ship's transponder was only activated on March 8th, showing the boat near Greece. Where could it have been for 12 days? A photo posted to Instagram on February 29th, geotagged at the Libyan port of Misrata, provides the answer.



Source: Instagram posted on February 29th 2020

⁶⁵ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yW8f9ptdY_o
110

The second port in Misrata belongs to LISCO, the Libyan Iron and Steel Company, located to the East of Misrata Port. We can see on the left hand-side in the background the red crane rail structures, which we can also see on LISCO Facebook account.



Source: LISCO Port Google Earth




Source: LISCO Facebook page

Was MV ANA damaged? Did the crew perform an assessment of the ship? It's impossible to say from open-source information.

MV ANA reappears with its transponder on March 8th near Greece, and in the docks in Istanbul on March 11th. MV ANA's transponder will stop emitting on March 18th at 18:04:46 UTC.

1.2. Transforming into MV PRAY physically and digitally with a new name, painting and IMO jamming on the AIS system

In a week, the vessel will change its identification. First physically with a new name MV PRAY which we can distinguish on a photo posted on social media on March 17th.




On the right: M/V Pray in Haydarpasa

Source: Instagram, posted on March 17, 2020

We can see that the tops of the towers have been painted in blue and the name PRAY has been painted on the hull. Looking at ANA's AIS data, we can infer it took place between the 11th and 112

17th when the ship was docked in a corner place, more suitable for loading side and rear at the same time.

While there are no containers visible on the upper deck in this photo, they appear on a March 18th photo, posted by an employee of TCDD – the port logistics company – which specializes in moving cranes. The vessel now looks like a container carrier, rather than a passenger ro-ro.



Source: Instagram, posted on March 18th, 2020


Its digital transformation takes place on March 18th. The last GPS position emitted by ANA is on March 18th, at 04h46 in the morning.

Quick Search: ANA × + Add Filter ▼


Timestamp: 2020-03-18 to 2020... ×

<input type="checkbox"/>	Timestamp	Source	Speed	Course	Latitude	Longitude
<input type="checkbox"/>	2020-03-18 04:46 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00448	29.01139

On the MarineTraffic map, we can see it docked at the port, and a closer inspection of images from Sentinel Hub shows it in the port on the same date.




ANA's position on 18/03




Sentinel Hub on 18/03

However on 20th March, the boat is no longer visible on the satellite image, even though ANA's GPS does not indicate any movement.



Sentinel Hub le 20/03

Interestingly, another ship appears to share ANA's position on the 18/03: the Tanzanian-flagged MV Pray, a passenger boat ([IMO 7295666](https://www.imo.org/en/idr/ships/details.aspx?id=7295666)).



MarineTraffic map displaying PRAY position on 18/03

Timestamp	Source	Speed	Course	Latitude	Longitude
2020-03-18 05:11 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00451	29.01136

PRAY has no navigation history and does not appear in any database. Its new AIS parameters includes a new IMO number but the same hull, which means the AIS parameters are being spoofed. Indeed, it is not permitted to have a new IMO for the same hull. It has a new flag, but there are no records of the vessel. Despite having containers on its deck, the ship is declared as a passenger vessel, possibly an attempt to avoid attracting the attention of patrolling military vessels.


This evidence leads us to believe that MV PRAY is MV ANA, and has spoofed its AIS parameters to give the illusion of a second boat.

2. A failed attempt to deliver a new arms shipment from Turkey due to an intervention of a French frigate

According to MV Pray's AIS data, the ship leaves Haydarpasa for Lavrio on March 19th but soon after updates its destination to Gabes in Tunisia.

PRAY	AIS Destination Changed	2020-03-19 10:29 UTC	From LAVRIO to TNGAE	BSEA	Marmara Sea
PRAY	AIS ETA Changed	2020-03-19 10:29 UTC	From 2020-09-19 04:00:00 to 2020-03-23 14:...	BSEA	Marmara Sea

The vessel navigates carefully along the Turkish coastline but with no port of call. This strange route is difficult to explain unless they are attempting to avoid transiting through Greek territorial waters. Eventually, the boat leaves Turkish territorial waters and heads in the direction of Gabes.



Source: twitter.com/aegeanhawk



Source: MarineTraffic


On March 23rd, approximately 166 nautical miles off the Tobruk coast, MV PRAY turns around and heads back to Antalya.

PRAY	AIS Destination Changed	2020-03-23 16:48 UTC	From <i>TNGAE</i> to <i>TRVANT</i>	EMED
PRAY	AIS ETA Changed	2020-03-23 16:48 UTC	From 2020-03-23 14:00:00 to 2020-03-26 08:...	EMED

Source: MarineTraffic

This sudden change of course corresponds to a reported interception by the French Army frigate Provence to prevent the vessel reaching Libya. According to newspaper reports⁶⁶, the French army had intelligence that the ship was carrying weapons to Libya. While no inspection was performed, the French managed to stop PRAY's journey and sent it back to Antalya. On its way back, the vessel is escorted by two Turkish frigates. But the involvement of the Turkish army does not stop at escorting back rogue ships.

66 <https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/03/29/french-navy-intercepts-ship-with-turkish-weapons-heading-for-libya/>
117



Source: twitter.com/aegeanhawk

3. The alleged involvement of the Turkish army in managing the unsuccessful arms shipment


3.1. Tracking MV PRAY and its shipment back to Istanbul

MV PRAY remained in the vicinity of Antalya for about three days, before heading to Mersin.

PRAY	DEPARTURE	Port	MERSIN	TR	2020-04-06 21:46 UTC	6d 2h 45m
PRAY	ARRIVAL	Port	MERSIN	TR	2020-03-31 19:01 UTC	-
PRAY	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	MERSIN ANCH	TR	2020-03-31 19:00 UTC	13h 50m
PRAY	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	MERSIN ANCH	TR	2020-03-31 05:10 UTC	-
PRAY	DEPARTURE	Anchorage	ANTALYA AN...	TR	2020-03-29 14:15 UTC	3d 10m
PRAY	ARRIVAL	Anchorage	ANTALYA AN...	TR	2020-03-26 14:05 UTC	-

Source: MarineTraffic

MV PRAY arrived in the port of Mersin on March 31st and we can see it docked at the port on April 3rd, 2020.



Source: Mersin Time, April 3, 2020

This pier has been used in the past by MV BANA docked next to a Turkish warship escorting it later as it was shown in the MV BANA chapter.

According to MV PRAY's AIS data, it leaves Mersin for Odessa, Ukraine on April 7th.

PRAY	AIS Destination Changed	2020-04-07 17:33 UTC	From LIMASSOL to UA/ODS
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Source: MarineTraffic

A photo of the boat taken during its transit of the Aegean Sea on April 9th indicates it is still loaded with cargo from its failed deliveries. Therefore, we can assume the cargo still contains weapons.



Source: George Kloutsiniotis, uploaded on MarineTraffic.com, on April 9, 2020

In the end, MV PRAY arrives in Istanbul on April 12th and docks in Haydarpasa.

PRAY	Arrival	2020-04-12 07:45 UTC	ISTANBUL
------	---------	-------------------------	----------

Source: MarineTraffic

Its arrival is visible on an open live feed from a camera in Kadikoy, confirming the AIS data.



Source: <https://istanbuluseyret.ibb.istanbul/camera>
M/V Pray arrives in Istanbul (on the left)

The cargo seems to be in the process of being unloaded on April 14th, 2020. On the picture below, the stern ramp is lowered, making it possible to unload vehicles, however the containers are still visible on the upper deck.



M/V Pray in Haydarpasa on April 14, 2020
Source: Cengiz Tokgoz, uploaded on VesselFinder.com on April 15

The ship is moving and turning on the 15th and 16th of April with a change of position on the 16th and another one on the 17th.

2020-04-16 16:47 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.2 knots	322 degrees	41.00449	29.01136
2020-04-16 16:23 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00449	29.01131
2020-04-16 15:57 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00449	29.01131
2020-04-16 15:36 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00449	29.01131
2020-04-16 15:12 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.3 knots	357 degrees	41.00448	29.01131
2020-04-17 11:17 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.0 knots	0 degrees	41.00356	29.01279
2020-04-17 10:53 UTC	Terr-AIS	0.3 knots	99 degrees	41.00393	29.01245

Source: MarineTraffic

A photo taken on April 16th appears to show the ship has been unloaded, with no sign of cargo on the upper deck.



Source: MarineTraffic
 Photo taken by Yoruk Isik on April 16th and uploaded on April 21st.


3.2. The Turkish army maintenance units unloading MV PRAY?

Other photos of MV PRAY on social media lead us to investigations users posting them. This first man is pictured with MV PRAY on the left around April 15th.



On the right: M/V Pray in Haydarpasa, probably on April 15, 2020
Source: social media, posted on April 16, 2020

Looking closely at his account, he seems to be in the military but there is not too much clue regarding his immediate environment.



We can however see an insignia on his cap which could indicate its unit: flame shape.



This insignia can be found on an army surplus online shop and indicates a unit called 'Bakim'.




According to the Turkish Ground Forces's website, BAKIM units are maintenance units in charge of maintaining, repairing and transporting military equipment (tanks, helicopters, etc) for the army.

Another individual posted a selfie on March 15th, 2020 taken on the port of Haydarpaşa in Istanbul before the departure of MV PRAY to Libya.




Source: social media

He posted several other pictures taken the same day, at the same location. The pictures were posted at 2:03 PM, from his mobile phone. It could have been a very short stay in Istanbul, as one of his friends commented: 'Boy, you came in Istanbul, why not telling me?'




Source: social media

He drives a Ford van, possibly a Ford Transit 350, cabin chassis. At some point, his van was parked inside the garage / lower deck of the Pray, meaning that his business in Istanbul is related to the ship.




Source: social media

The picture on the left was taken at the entry of the garage, at the stern of the ship (shot from the stern to the bow). The picture on the right was taken inside the garage of the ship (shot from the bow to the stern). At this stage the ship seems empty.



Source: social media

He has also posted three 'live' videos on the 15th of March, one in the morning and two in the evening, showing him driving on a motorway.




Source: social media

The analysis of the 1st video shows that the individual was driving on O-4 (westbound, from Ankara to Istanbul). He made a rest stop at Düzce Yeşilyayla (two hours from Istanbul Haydarpaşa) at 11:30 AM.



(screenshot from the 1st video)




(Google street view)

Source: social media

The analysis of the 3rd video shows that he arrived in Ankara on the 15th, during the night, driving on O-4 then on Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bv. He was not alone in the cabin of the van (people speaking in the background).




(screenshot from the 3rd video)



(Google street view)


It seems the individual delivered/picked up goods or personal to MV PRAY. Digging further in his profile shows he is linked to Turkish Armed Forces.

He is based in Ankara (see his intro and other details on his account).



Source: social media

He visited Topkapi Palace on March 13, and Istanbul airport the day before, so he possibly came a first time in Istanbul on March 12, i.e., the day after MV Pray arrived at Haydarpaşa.



Source: social media

The individual has a military background (military service in his early twenties, around 1994), an experience of which he seems quite proud...




(screenshots from a slideshow on his Facebook, posted on April 7, 2020, with pictures of himself only)

Besides pictures of him in his early twenties, no other picture of him in uniform. He does not mention any current affiliation on his account, but he may work (or used to work) as an electrical engineer (see recent pictures below).




(screenshots from a slideshow on his Facebook, posted on April 7, 2020, with pictures of himself only)

He has many contacts in the Turkish Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence. He has 500+ contacts. About 80% of them don't mention their job, but nearly half of those who are mentioning it are affiliated to the military. Some recent pictures of him with individuals in military outfits:



In addition, a significant number of his friends are affiliated to the maintenance branch of the Turkish Ministry of Defence. For instance:



Source: social media

According to his post, the other man on the picture is the director of '5.ANABAKIM' aka '5.ABM', which refers to the 5th Main Factory of the Turkish Ministry of Defence. 5. ABM is specialized in maintaining and upgrading helicopters, including gunships.



MİLLÎ SAVUNMA BAKANLIĞI 5. ANA BAKIM FABRİKA MÜD.




(from an article on 5.ABM published on kokpit.aero, on January 29, 2015)



(from the Facebook account of 5.ABM)

In addition, several of his friends are employed by the 45th maintenance centre (45.BKM). 45.BKM is specialized in maintaining armoured vehicles.



(screenshot of the Instagram account of 45.BKM)



(from the Facebook account of 45.BKM)



This individual seems to be working/ have worked for the Turkish Armed Forces as an engineer or a technician.

Pending questions remain on MV PRAY, especially the individuals spotted on social media before MV PRAY left to Libya and after it came back: are they fully affiliated with Turkish Armed Forces? Were there presences a coincidence or does it reveal the role of Turkish Armed Forces in handling arms deliveries to Libya? If so, what were their roles? And what was loaded inside MV PRAY?

Conclusion

At the time of writing this report a new vessel⁶⁷ – Cirkin (IMO: 7728699), belonging to AVRASYA SHIPPING CO LTD⁶⁸– has been spotted transporting suspicious cargoes from Turkey on two occasions. On May 28th, 2020⁶⁹, the boat turned off its AIS system and allegedly delivered Turkish made tanks⁷⁰ to Misrata Port. During a second trip, MV Cirkin was intercepted in a maritime intervention launched by a Greek vessel part of EU Irimi Operation on June 10th. The Turkish frigates escorting the vessel invoked immunity for the ship, citing the fact that it was under the control of the Turkish State, to prevent an inspection⁷¹. The vessel arrived in Misrata Port on June 11th⁷². MV Cirkin could be another case of shadow arms deliveries by Turkey to investigate further.



Cirkin leaving the Port of Haydarpaşa on June 7th – source: <https://youtu.be/H-K1XOcCdCE>

This report has examined the role of Turkey in the delivery of arms to Libya, demonstrating the role and value of open-source research and analysis as a tool to detect embargo and sanction violations. By using all available types of sources: social media, maritime and aviation data, catalogues, free satellite imagery, commercial registers etc, we are able to build a strong picture of potential violations and accumulate supporting circumstantial evidence. This evidence can provide the basis to trigger further investigations in order to confirm these findings and build a solid case.

The six cases explored in OpenFacto's investigation show the delivery of Turkish manufactured heavy armaments or the transfer of weapons from the Turkish arsenal. Each delivery has been shipped using commercial shipping modes to recipients in Libya that are politically supported by Turkey. In most cases, we are able to identify the type of arms delivered, their manufacturing origin

67 <https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:410240/mmsi:677028900/imo:7728699/vessel:CIRKIN>

68 <http://www.avrasyashipping.com/gemi/cirkin>

69 <https://www.facebook.com/LNAspox/posts/1364456610416105>

70 <https://twitter.com/DavidBiutitaman/status/1265631294748160002?s=20>

71 <https://www.tribune.gr/politics/news/article/671663/lathremporio-oplon-ypon-ton-elegcho-tis-toyrkikis-dimokratias-to-peristatiko-me-to-cirkin.html&usg=ALkJrhiHpTpa4Gc4Ky7hMmfizCYXnblyZg>

72 <https://libya.liveuamap.com/en/2020/11-june-tanzanian-flag-ro-ro-cirkin-is-arriving-to-misrata>

and the pro-GNA affiliates receiving and using them in warfare. In each case, it is possible to identify which shipping company was mandated to transport containers and reconstruct their journey.

We identify a pattern of behaviour that appears to be an attempt to conceal the origin of goods, the sender and routes to Libya:

- Using predominantly non-Turkish shipping lines for transport.
- Departing from a foreign country, with a stopover in Turkey, and/or indicating a false destination.
- Spoofing AIS data and “going dark” to avoid detection.
- Using indirect routes through Turkish territorial water to avoid scrutiny from other countries’ navies for as long as possible.
- Changing ship names and boat types.
- Changing crews to prevent information leaks.
- Strengthening physical and online operational security to minimise images of vessels, deliveries, materials.
- Using Turkish military frigates to escort boats to prevent interception in European seas or attacks at the final destination.

In half of the cases, the shipping companies used in transport had already been involved in sanction violations on behalf of other clients, both Libyan or international. Some shipping companies appear to have a strong track record in delivering illegal goods. Most vessels were escorted by Turkish military navy on part or all of their journey.

The final case study of MV Pray potentially shows the involvement of a logistics division of the Turkish armed forces in loading and unloading goods before and after it went to Libya.

When taken together, the six cases appear to constitute clear violations by Turkey of the arms embargo on Libya as set out by the UN.

Open-sources research: a detection tool

Open source research can help document Turkey's multiple violations of the Libyan arms embargo. OpenFacto has been following the conflict in Libya for several months, monitoring open-source information and databases. We have specifically focused on the military support provided by several international actors to local armed factions, which is contrary to the resolution passed by the UN Security Council in 2011. This guide focuses on Turkey and its multiple violations of the arms embargo in Libya. Through six case studies, we will show how open-sources can be used to identify and document Turkey's failure to comply with the Security Council resolution, ultimately contributing and aggravating the conflict. In this article we show the methodology for:

- Identification of ships and planes used for arms deliveries through cross-checking of reports, social networks and the study of traffic to Libyan ports from Turkey and airports.
- Identification of arms delivery networks or mercenaries linked to arms shipping, terrorist groups and business interest.
- Identification of the Turkish industrials who manufactured the weapons.
- Identification of the GNA as recipients of the arms (supported by Turkey in the conflict).

Using these methods, we have identified multiple examples that taken together point to a state strategy of concerted support to the Libyan conflict.

Through these six cases, this guide proposes below a methodology for monitoring and documenting violations of arms embargoes using open-sources.

A methodology for open-source monitoring of arms embargoes

The arms embargo regime is a restriction and/or a series of sanctions that apply to arms in the broadest sense but also to so-called « dual-use » technologies (understood to mean both civilian and military). Arms embargoes can have a political, military objective and be a peacekeeping mechanism. It is important to understand what the arms embargo covers in the selected case study of Libya.

In Libya, the arms embargo regime prohibits the sale or supply of « arms and related materiel of all types: arms and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and matching spare parts, and prohibits the export by Libya of all arms and related materiel » according to Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) of the Libya Committee.

When seeking to identify violations of the embargo by a State actor or otherwise, the main challenge is identifying and establishing the complex system of transactions, purchasing and delivery channels, that are in essence as secretive as possible. In order to be efficient and to try to direct your monitoring and research effectively, we propose a focus on three nodes: the actors involved, the equipment and the delivery circuit.

Detecting embargoes

The implementation of an arms embargo or sanctions is decided by the UN Security Council or other state actors such as the European Union. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute lists them and refers to the official documents instituting the implementation of embargoes.

The UN Security Council establishes an embargo monitoring committee by resolution. This committee, made up of a panel of experts, regularly produces very informative reports on the conditions of compliance or violations of the embargo. These reports are a veritable mine of information that focus precisely on the entities or logistical means that make up the circumvention circuit.

Actors involved

A good understanding of the conflict in an embargoed country makes it possible to map the local forces involved, and their known or potential international allies. It is important to understand from which international actor factions will seek support in order to identify the potential supplier/buyer relationship that can be established. It's time to set up your Tweetdeck with lists to keep track of news and subject-matter experts on your topic of interest.

- To witness the material used by the local armed group, social networks are your best friends! Photos or videos of material that has arrived at its destination can be collected via postings by an armed group's communication organs, or through the social media accounts of members. These can provide proof of the material's journey from one point to another:
 - Follow the pages of the various factions' media outlets on social networks: Facebook, Telegram, Instagram...
 - Follow the pages of social networks dedicated to armed groups or warlords.
 - Follow local newspapers that support different factions online to retrieve the images.

Equipments

SIPRI provides several databases that give an idea of the volumes of arms exported by certain countries. In the case of clandestine activity such as the violation of an embargo, the figures will not necessarily be there, but some indications may attract attention.

- Specialised maritime information sites regularly post news about maritime seizures of illegal goods or arms: the ports and names of ships are mentioned.
- Some organizations specializing in arms trafficking research publish guides to identifying some weapons: Small Arms Survey, Conflict Armament Research and iTrace portal.
- Following Twitter accounts: @CalibreObscura, @ArmoryBazaar, @AbraxasSpa, @Silah_Report, etc...
- Via the videos and images posted online: identify the material but also the quantities where possible.

Delivery routes

Circumvention of embargoes is carried out by logistics companies that care little for UN Council resolutions, often by falsifying export documents. It is therefore necessary to identify the ships or aircraft by which the arms are transported and the companies involved.

The study of the movements of ships and aircraft, as well as of the country's embargoed ports, makes it possible to identify the means of transport used to carry the weapons. The basic tools are:

- Marine Traffic, Vessels Finder.
- Flight radar.
- Equasis an interesting ship-related database which makes it possible to identify ownership.

Once in possession of the company's name, it is necessary to search corporate registration databases and to check the company's reputation: presence on lists, jurisdictions, other vessels or aircraft conducting questionable deliveries, affiliations of directors.

- OCCRP Aleph large database.
- OpenCorporate, very interesting for companies in Panama...
- ICIJ leaks-based database.

Websites like Panjiva or 52wmb.com may sometimes show the company sending or receiving shipment on behalf of the sender or the final recipient (as a consignee): this sometimes makes it possible to identify an intermediary in the armament supply network and identify volumes.

Finally, it is necessary to cross-check and compile all the findings to see the recurrence of this type of over a certain period of time.

Identified equipment

ARMoured VEHICLES



KIRPI II

Manufacturer: BMC Otomotiv, Turkey

Main characteristics: BMC Kirpi is a mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle (MRAP). It resembles a heavy truck equipped with armour protection. Equipped with mine blast-resistant seats, the vehicle has the capability to accommodate up to 13 personnel, including a driver, gunner, and commander.

Seen on: MV AMAZON

Delivery date: May 2019

Recipient: GNA-affiliated brigades

VURAN

Manufacturer: BMC Otomotiv, Turkey

Main characteristics: The BMC Vuran (4X4) Multi Purpose Armoured Vehicle was developed to perform a full range of missions such as patrolling, surveillance, weapon carrying and security. The V-shaped hull is of all-welded steel armour construction that provides the occupants with protection against 5.56 × 45 mm small arms fire, although also available is protection against 7.62 × 51 mm armour-piercing small arms fire.

Seen on: MV AMAZON

Delivery date: May 2019

Recipient: GNA- affiliated brigades



ACV-15

Manufacturer: FNSS Savunma Sistemleri

Main characteristics: The ACV-15 is a light combat tracked armoured vehicle able to operate alongside tanks in a combined arms team. The ACV-15 is a combat proven medium weight, low silhouette armoured vehicle capable of high mobility in all kinds of terrain and amphibious operations on rivers and lakes.

Seen on: MV BANA

Delivery date: January 2020

Recipient: GNA

TANK AND ARTILLERY**T-155 Firtina**

Manufacturer: Turkish consortium of companies

Main characteristics: The T-155 Firtina is a 155mm 52 calibre self-propelled howitzer. The main armament of the T-155 Firtina consists of 155mm 52 calibre barrel. A standard 155 mm M107 high-explosive projectile can be fired to a maximum range of 18 km or a M549 rocket-assisted high-explosive projectile to a maximum range of 30 km. The hull and turret of the T-155 Firtina are made in all-welded steel armour which provide a protection for the crew against firing of small arms and shell splinters.

Seen on: MV BANA

Delivery date: January 2020

Recipient: GNA





Oerlikon

Manufacturer: MKEK (under licence)

Main characteristics: The Oerlikon 35 mm twin cannon is a towed anti-aircraft gun with an Fire Control Unit Skyguard that detects and tracks air targets up to 20 km and computes firing data. The Oerlikon 35 mm GDF-002 automatic anti-aircraft gun is used primarily as an anti-aircraft weapon but can also be applied against ground targets

Seen on: MV BANA, MV ANA (allegedly)

Delivery date: January & February 2020

Recipient: GNA

AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM

Korkut

Manufacturer: ASELAN

Main characteristics: KORKUT is a self-propelled air-defence gun system. The KORKUT system can detect, track, identify and destroy aerial targets. It is capable of carrying out missions on heavy armoured platforms such as main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. The air defence system can engage air-to-ground missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as low-flying helicopters and fighter aircraft within the maximum range of 4,000m.

Seen on: MV SINGLE EAGLE, MV BANA

Delivery date: January 2020

Recipient: GNA



MIM-23 Hawk



Manufacturer: Raytheon, USA (under licence HAWK system)

Main characteristics: The HAWK (Homing All the Way Killer) MIM-23 is an all-weather low to medium altitude ground-to-air missile system. The MIM-23B has a minimum engagement range of 1.5 kilometres, a maximum range of 35 km, a minimum engagement altitude of 60 metres, a maximum engagement altitude of 18,000 m and a warhead of 75 kg HE blast/fragmentation.

Seen on: MV SINGLE EAGLE

Delivery date: January 2020

Recipient: GNA

AN-MPQ 64



Manufacturer: Raytheon, USA (under licence HAWK system)

Main characteristics: The AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel is a 3D radar used to alert and queue Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) weapons to the locations of hostile targets approaching their front line forces. The radar automatically acquires, tracks, classifies, identifies and reports targets, including cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and both rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. It uses a high scan rate (30 RPM) and operates at a range of 40 km (25 mi).

Seen on: MV SINGLE EAGLE

Delivery date: January 2020

Recipient: GNA

MACHINE GUNS AND MISSILES

Machine gun MG-1MManufacturer: Arsenal, BulgariaMain characteristics: 7.62x54 mm ARSENAL Machine Guns MG-1M are powerful automatic weapons, used as armament against enemy troops and firing points. The MG-1M design is specially intended and allows operation of the weapon in heavy climatic conditions, which are typical for the regions of Middle East, south-east Asia and Africa.Seen on: MV AMAZON (allegedly)Delivery date: May 2019Recipient: GNA- affiliated brigades**AT-3 Sagger 9K11 Malyutka**Manufacturer: Soviet Union origin, used by TurkeyMain characteristics: The AT-3 Sagger (Russian name 9K11 Malyutka) , is a Russian made wire-guided anti-tank missile equipped with a shaped-charge high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead. The missile can be fired from a portable suitcase launcher (9P111), armoured vehicle and helicopters. The missile takes about 5 minutes to deploy from its 9P111 fibreglass suitcase, which also serves as the launching platform. The SAGGER is capable of engaging targets at ranges of 500 to 3,000 meters and can penetrate over 400 mm of armour.Seen on: MV AMAZON (allegedly)Delivery date: May 2019Recipient: GNA- affiliated brigades

Glossary

Abou Merhi Group	Lebanese holding group with shipping activities	GNA	Government of National Accord
Aerotrascargo	Moldovan aviation shipping group	IMO	The International Maritime Organization number is a unique identifier for ships, registered ship owners and management companies.
AIS	The automatic identification system is an automatic tracking system that uses transponders on ships and is used by vessel traffic services.	Kalyioncu Group	Turkish holding group specialized in vegetables import/export
Major General Ahmed al-Mismari	LNA spokesman	Khalifa Haftar	Marshall of the LNA
Al Marsa	Brigade based in Misrata and allied with the GNA	LNA	Libyan National Army
Al Samood	Brigade based in Misrata and allied with the GNA	MSN	Manufacturer's Serial Number is a unique number or code assigned to a unit.
Airway bill	Receipt issued by an international airline for goods and an evidence of the contract of carriage, it is a document of title to the goods	MKEK	Turkish Defence Industrial
ASELAN	Turkish Defence Industrial	MV	Marine Vessel
Ashraf Mami	Foreign Affair officer and aid to Salah Badi	Salah Badi	Head of Al Samood Brigade
Bill of lading	Document issued by a carrier (or their agent) to acknowledge receipt of cargo for shipment.	Shega Lines	Albanian shipping group
BMC Otomotiv	Turkish Defence Industrial	Transponder	Device that, upon receiving a signal, emits a different signal in response
Call sign	Communication call signs assigned as unique identifiers to aircraft.	Port of Misrata	GPS coordinates: 32.35415° / 15.24018°

Fayez el-Sarraj	Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya	Port of Tripoli	GPS coordinates: 32.89762° / 13.17951°
FNSS Savunma Sistemleri	Turkish Defence Industrial	Misrata airport	GPS coordinates: 32° 19' 32" nord, 15° 03' 35" est
GASG	Global aviation and services group/ Global air transport	Mitiga airport	GPS coordinates: 32° 53' 40" nord, 13° 16' 40" est